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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is first to introduce the concept of
trading with the enemy, as defined and governed by international
law. The thesis then applies this definition, and the stipulations
it embodies, to the statutory laws passed and the Supreme Court
decisions rendered concerning interbelligerent trade during the Civil
War. The study traces the efforts of Union lawmakers to control
trade between the North and the South, and the extent to which those
efforts reflected international legal theory. Discussion then turns
to the Supreme Court cases dealing with the wartime trade, and the
degree to which the Court’s decisions upheld the tenets of inter
national law. Finally, the study briefly examines the application
of international law to twentieth-century warfare.

v

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY:
LEGAL THEORY AND THE CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER I
CIVIL WAR TRADE WITH THE ENEMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

A nation at war demands sacrifices of soldier and civilian alike.
The soldier*s potential sacrifice can be severe— he may suffer wounds
or death in furthering the cause of his country.

While perhaps less

exacting, civilian sacrifices are no less important. Merchants and
traders are among those civilians who feel the demands of war most
directly, as lucrative avenues of commerce are often closed during
hostilities.
The temptation to ignore such closures and to conduct illegal
commercial transactions can be great.

Economic regulations may be

as important as military strategy in winning a war, but merchants are
often able to convince themselves that ignoring them is only a slight
offense.

Evasions can yield great profits while seemingly causing

little personal harm.

Such evasions can sap the strength and morale of

a nation, however, especially if they provide economic aid to the enemy.
Civilians as much as soldiers must obey the rules if their nation is
to win at war.
Political and legal thinkers have developed a body of law that
contains rules of warfare applicable to all nations.

International

law matured in the nineteenth century as an attempt to govern the war
and peacetime relationships of m o d e m nations.

Though interpreted

and enforced by each state in its own way, the rules and principles of
2

3
international law continue to direct the conduct of nations.
Works of international law discuss at length the topic of trading
with the enemy.
trade.

Few nations would deny the evil of interbelligerent

Nevertheless, the gap between acceptance in theory and enforce

ment in practice has never been easily closed.

The complexity of the

problem has led legal theorists to develop a set of principles and regu
lations with which to enforce the interdiction of trade with the enemy.
According to the nineteenth-century legal commentator James Kent, the
principle of trade interdiction became the accepted doctrine of English
courts.

Following the English example, American law adopted the prin

ciple as well.

Congress upheld trade prohibition during the Revolutionary

War, and the United States Supreme Court supported trade interdiction in
rulings arising from the War of 1812.^
Henry Halleck, a widely-recognized authority on international law
and soon to be general in chief of Union armies, cited Kent in 1861 to
emphasize the importance of trade interdiction:

"The idea that any

commercial intercourse can lawfully subsist between the people of the
powers at war, except under the clear and express sanction of the govern
ment, and without a special license, is utterly inconsistent with the
duties growing out of a state of war."

2

The doctrine of trade interdiction rendered null and void all con
tracts with the enemy during the war.

The doctrine also made it illegal

for citizens to insure enemy property, purchase bills on the enemy*s
country, remit or deposit funds there, or remit money or bills to enemy
subjects.

All endeavors at trade with the enemy through the intervention

of third parties or through partnerships were also forbidden.

No artifice

could legalize any trade, communication, or contact whatsoever with the
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enemy, without the government’s express permission.
as citizens were obliged to obey the rules of war.

Enemy aliens as well
The subjects of the

various belligerent powers could not begin or carry on any correspondence
or business together, and all commercial partnerships existing before
3

the war were dissolved by "the mere force and act of the war itself."
However harsh their disapproval of interbelligerent trade, states usually
regarded it as less than treasonable.

The American Civil War provided

no exception to this general rule; treason charges were not pressed
against either disloyal Northerners or adherents to the Confederacy
who engaged in illicit trade.
Still, if not considered treasonable, interbelligerent trade was
clearly and forcefully proscribed by international law.

Joseph Chitty,

an English legal theorist, was an acknowledged expert on the legal
restrictions governing enemy trade.

In The Law of Nations (1812) he

stated that there was "no such thing as a war for arms and a peace for
commerce."

Commercial intercourse aided the enemy, so a state of war

naturally required that it cease.
and assist the enemy," he declared.

"It is criminal in a subject to aid
"Trading affords that aid in the

most effectual manner by enabling the merchants of the enemy's country
to support their government."

5

Nor could trade be allowed by engaging a neutral agent.

Chitty

observed that aid was "equally given to the enemy, whether goods be
furnished immediately by the enemy, or through the medium of a neutral
merchant."

Accordingly, neutrals who traded between enemies lost their

neutral rights:
A class of people may not be enemies in the strict sense
of the word yet must be deemed alien enemies to certain
intents and purposes of a commercial nature, so that their

5
property may, for the most part, be taken as prize,
according to the laws of war between adverse bellig
erents. Therefore, when we speak of an hostile charac
ter, it is to be understood to imply, not hostility to
all intents and purposes, but only that degree of
hostility which attaches to particular property.^
Thus, cargo traded illegally was confiscable even if the trader
were a citizen of a neutral country.

The trader was only considered as

hostile, however, in that particular instance of enemy trade.

The rules

of condemnation hence applied to the citizens of a belligerent nation
and to traders of neutral countries alike.

Moreover, belligerent property

assigned to neutrals for shipping was likewise subject to confiscation.
Condemned cargo was labelled as prize during a period of war between two
nations.

According to A. D. M. McNair and A. D. Watts, special bodies

called prize courts enforced the prohibition against trading with the
enemy by condemning not only the cargo involved but also the ships

g
carrying it.

It was the final destination of the cargo that was the

key to its protection or condemnation.
Legal theorists allowed one exception to that rule, however.

Goods

purchased under an order given prior to hostilities were exempt from
confiscation.

Yet this exception was very rigidly applied.

Ignorance

of the commencement of hostilities did not excuse interbelligerent trade.
In the words of one expert on international law, "The entire absence of
any intention to violate the law, no matter how perfect the innocence
of the intent may have been, nor whether the act resulted from mistake
9

or ignorance, cannot avert the penalty of confiscation."

Again, the

ultimate destination of the goods, rather than the intent of the shipper,
determined the legal character of the trade.
Nor did it matter how circuitous the route by which the goods

6
reached their destination.

A vessel engaged in unlawful trade with the

enemy was liable to capture and condemnation at any time during the
voyage in which the offense was committed.
the completion of the voyage.

Liability ceased only with

Finally, the failure to effect an actual

transfer of goods did not exonerate a ship or cargo from confiscation.
Engaging in a voyage with that design was sufficient to incur liability.^
All inhabitants of a country, whether native or stranger, were
required to recognize and adhere to these stipulations:

"Every person

in a country . . . whether a native or stranger, owes obedience to its
laws, and the rule of international jurisprudence, which forbids all
intercourse and trade with the public enemy, is just as obligatory upon
him as the municipal laws of revenue or regulations of police.
This obedience did, however, allow some room for variation.

One

exception to complete prohibition has already been illustrated, and
there were two other possibilities of escaping total interdiction.
These exceptions came under two headings— exercizing the rights of
humanity in a situation of extreme economic hardship, and sanctioning
trade by license or authority of the government:
The first would permit trade to a limited and rare
extent; the second, results from the fact, that on
certain occasions it is highly expedient for the state
to permit an intercourse with the enemy, by commerce
or otherwise; but the state alone, and not individuals,
must determine when it shall be permitted, and under
what regulations.12
The Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek, an authority often cited
by English and American judges from the Napoleonic era on, observed "that
the interests of trade, and the necessity of obtaining certain commodities
have sometimes so far overpowered this [prohibition], that different
species of traffic have been permitted. . . . But it is in all cases

the act and permission of the sovereign."

13

Three landmark cases revealed the application of these principles
of international law in the period prior to the Civil War.

The case of

The Hoop (1799), a turning point in the development of English prize law,
involved goods purchased in French-occupied Holland on the account of
British merchants and shipped in a neutral vessel to a British port.
These goods were captured and confiscated as prize of war.
to Sir William Scott’s decision, "There exists . . .

According

a general rule in

the maritime jurisprudence of this country, by which all subjects[* ]
trading with the public enemy, unless with the permission of the sovereign,
is interdicted."
by Bynkershoek.

Scott based his decision in part on an opinion delivered
Even in the absence of specific prohibition, war, "as

the phrasing of the formal declaration proves," rendered trade illegal.
Old World legal precedents would be followed in the New World.

14

As

John Marshall wrote, "The United States having, at one time, formed a
component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize
law."

15

This was certainly true in the case of The Rapid (1814), one

of the first American court decisions to reflect the influence of inter
national law regarding enemy trade.
That case involved an American who purchased goods in England before
the War of 1812 and deposited them on British-owned Indian Island in Nova
Scotia.

After the war began he hired the Rapid to bring his goods from

the island to the United States.

On that voyage the ship was captured

by an American privateer on the high seas and brought into Salem,
Massachusetts.

The goods were libelled as prize and condemned to the

captors on the ground that they had acquired the character of enemy’s
property.

8
The owner appealed to the Supreme Court, but Justice William
Johnson cited the opinions of Bynkershoek and The Hoop to uphold con
demnation.

JohnsonTs decision was an important one, as the justice

himself realized:

"'This is the first case, since its organization, in

which this Court has been called upon to assert the rights of war
against the property of a citizen.'"

16

Basing his decision on common

law rather than statutory law, Johnson stated that the nature and con
sequences of a state of war directed his conclusion.

In the state of

war citizens of belligerent states met only in combat; war stripped
man of his social nature.

Though Johnson acknowledged that rules of

modern warfare have lessened some of the barbarities of war,
on the subject which particularly affects this case,
there has been no general relaxation. The universal
sense of nations has acknowledged the demoralizing
effects that would result from the admission of
individual intercourse. . . . The law of prize is part
of the law of nations. In it, a hostile character is
attached to trade, independently of the character of
the trader who pursues or directs it. Condemnation
to the use of the captor is equally the fate of the
property of the belligerent, and of the property
found engaged in anti-neutral trade. But a citizen
or ally may be engaged in a hostile trade, and thereby
involve his propej^y in the fate of those in whose
cause he embarks.
A second Supreme Court decision also reflected English precedents
in its consideration of wartime trade.

The case of Jecker v. Montgomery

(1855) involved the seizure of an American vessel during the MexicanAmerican War.

The Admittance was taken by an American war vessel in

California upon suspicion of trading with the enemy.

The chaplain of one

of the American warships— a man authorized by the President of the
United States to exercise admiralty jurisdiction in cases of capture—
condemned the Admittance as lawful prize.

9
The condemnation was appealed and upheld in the United States
Circuit Court for Washington, D. C.
appealed to the Supreme Court.

The owners of the Admittance then

In delivering the opinion which upheld

the circuit court’s decision, Justice Peter Daniel cited theorists
Henry Wheaton and Cornelius van Bynkershoek as well as The Rapid for
legal support.

Finding evidence of premeditated trade, the Court

accordingly supported the act of confiscation.

"In the present case,"

Justice Daniel observed, "the evidence shows that the owners of the
ship and cargo knew that the destination of the voyage was to an enemy’s
port.

Even if the owner of the vessel was ignorant of it, the fate of

the vessel must be decided by the acts of those persons who had her in
v,
»19
charge.
This case marked the last Supreme Court decision concerning trading
with the enemy before the Civil War.

By the 1860s then, the dictates of

international law were clearly recognized.

American courts admitted

only two exceptions to complete prohibition of trade between enemies.
The "rights of humanity" permitted the supply of life-sustaining goods
to the victims of war.
prohibition.

And, the sovereign could license exceptions to

During the Civil War, Americans recognized the difficulty

of applying these exceptions, especially the second.
The Union, for example, had the difficulty of determining where
sovereignty lay.

Since Congress alone had the power to declare war, it

alone could partially suspend war by issuing licenses to trade with the
enemy.

This theoretical understanding did not withstand the test of

Civil War.

Congress delegated the licensing authority to the executive

branch, and many criticized this delegation as overly generous.

Lincoln

10
used his war powers with zeal, and often at the expense of congressional
intentions.

Many in Congress wanted a complete interdiction of trade

with the Confederacy, but

Lincoln's licensing powers removed all possi

bilities of comprehensive

prohibition.

These divergent attitudes led to a policy toward trade with the
Confederacy that met with
torians.

In

criticism both from contemporaries and his

a dissertation on the wartime trade, Robert Frank Futrell

outlined a report issued in Spring

of 1865by the joint Congressional

Committee on

Commerce.

charged that

the Confederate goods received harmed rather than benefitted

the Union cause.

Denouncing federal trade policies, the committee

The report warned that trade prolonged the war,

costing the country thousands of lives and "millions upon millions of
treasure.

„20

Yet Lincoln had strong grounds for his relatively lenient policy.
Futrell suggested some of the factors influencing that policy:
To the Lincoln administration, with its necessary sensi
tivity to the importunities of an electorate which was
divided in its sympathies toward the war, the problem of
trade was much more complicated than it appeared to the
Federal field commanders and to the politicians and
historians who reflected their opinions. . . . The prob
lem of Federal trade became that of securing Southern
cotton needed to keep Northern spindles turning, to
clothe a Union army, to assuage European powers which
were impatient with the Federal coastal blockade, and to
sustain the gold reserves of the Federal Treasury, which,
even with heavy grain exports, were relentlessly drained
by an unfavorable balance of trade.^
Northern and European industrialists applied heavy pressure upon Lincoln
to keep the cotton routes open.

Lincoln also recognized the difficult

position of Southerners living in areas occupied by Union troops who
would be destitute unless they could sell their supplies of cotton.
Lincoln was therefore reluctant to proclaim total trade interdiction.

11
The Confederacy existed four months before the enactment of trade regu
lations.

After Fort Sumter, however, northern states clamored for

federal action to control commercial intercourse between the sections.
Although some civilians demanded continued trade with the Confederate
states, many Union military officers wanted to ban all traffic as
giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

22

Believing that some steps were necessary, Lincoln first issued a
blockade limited to the coasts of states controlled by the Confederacy.
In April of 1861, these states included South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.

Lincoln’s proclamation

stated that any vessel attempting to leave or enter a blockaded port
would be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, where proceedings would be initiated against her and her cargo as prize.

23

On

April 27 a second proclamation extended the blockade to the ports of
Virginia and North Carolina.
Lincoln issued the blockade cautiously, for he feared provoking the
border states, and Kentucky in particular, into secession.
was not immediately implemented by a stoppage of trade.

This blockade

But as northern

resentment against the South increased, the War Department took steps
to enforce the internal blockade.

According to Futrell, the War and

Treasury departments authorized a tight blockade of the insurrectionary
states, but at the same time cautioned against "vexacious or unnecessary"
interruption of regular commerce.

The attempt to prohibit trade with

insurgents while allowing trade with loyal citizens within insurrectionary
states proved impracticable.
dealt with the border states.

Neither the War nor the Treasury department
Kentucky was an important avenue into

the cotton belt, and the Union was reluctant to take steps that would

12
induce it to abandon its neutrality for Confederate loyalties.
Some contemporaries thought that Lincoln had already taken too
much initiative in his wartime measures.

Because the Civil War began

during a congressional recess, for nearly three months all necessary
measures of resistance were executive acts performed without legislative
authorization.

The question of the legality of Lincoln's early acts was

only settled in 1863 by the Supreme Court in Prize Cases.

This case

concerned ships captured for violating the presidents blockade procla
mations of April 19 and 27, 1861.

The plaintiffs argued that war must

begin with a declaration, and that Congress alone had the power to declare
war.

The president1s power of suppressing an insurrection did not equal

the war power, and the right to promulgate a blockade order became valid
only after war was a legal fact through congressional declaration.

The

plaintiffs further argued that war did not exist when the early captures
were made; hence there was no valid blockade and no prize jurisdiction
in the federal courts.

24

The Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the legality of war from the
time of Lincoln1s blockade orders.

While a president was powerless to

initiate wars, he did have the authority to resist force by force.

The

Court did not consider that the president had exceeded his power,
although four of the nine justices dissented.

The four dissenting

justices refused to equate the president's legitimate power to suppress
an insurrection with the power to initiate a legal state of war.
their view, the Civil War did not begin by executive proclamation.

In
25

It would be a mistake to over-emphasize the strength of the dissent,
however, as the Court divided only upon the presidential actions that
occurred between April and July of 1861.

The entire Court agreed that

13
from July 13, 1861, when Congress acted, a legal state of war existed,
which invested Lincoln with belligerent powers appropriate to an execu26
tive.
When convened in 1861, most Congressmen did not see Lincoln’s
actions as usurping their authority.

In a report issued July 4, 1861,

Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase asked Congress and the
president to provide stricter guidelines for controlling intercourse
between the sections.

Chase recommended passage of an enactment giving

the president the power to label the insurrection as civil war, and
thereby the power to prohibit commerce with the South except under
presidential license.

27

A definition of the hostility was important

in determining the status of the belligerents.

28

Recognizing the necessity of such an act, Congress passed legisla
tion on July 12 authorizing a presidential proclamation of war.

Speaking

in support of Chase’s request, Senator Jacob Collamer (Vt.) reported on
the importance of obtaining a formal declaration of war.

Such a declara

tion alone would give the war a locality:
When an insurrection exists, it may be of such a charac
ter and kind . . . that the Executive could never use
against it those powers which are incident to a condition
of war, unless you give it locality. . . . [I]t is utterly
impracticable ever to put down a local insurrection by
any sort of withholding intercourse incident to war,
unless you withhold all intercourse from that section
of country. You cannot carry supplies to a people and
not carry supplies to the insurgents whom they maintain.29
Senator Willard Saulsbury (Del.) worried, however, that the rights of
loyal citizens would be abridged under complete prohibition.

Collamer

answered that it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal
men in the same state.

Still, he admitted that there might be loyal

parts of a state wherein trade should be continued.

For this reason, the

14
July act allowed the president to exercise his discretion in issuing a
trading license to persons and parts of the country.

The bill, which

passed the Senate by a 36-6 vote, established Lincoln's power to declare
the inhabitants of a state in insurrection against the United States.
Such a declaration would authorize the cessation of trade between the
United States and those states.

Reflecting the dictates of international

law, the act stated that "all goods and chattels coming from such a
state, together with the vessel carrying them are to be forfeited to
the United States."

30

The act also recognized the president's power to issue licenses,
though it stipulated that "such intercourse shall be conducted only in
pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury."

31

Chase requested trade licenses only for those areas of

the Confederacy occupied by Union forces.

The act allowed the president

to use his discretion to "license and permit commercial intercourse with
any such part of said state or section, the inhabitants of which are so
declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such
time, and by such persons, as he . . . may think most conducive to the
public interest."

32

This law did not immediately affect the status of intersectional
trade.

It was not until August that Lincoln issued the proclamation

formally prohibiting commerce with the rebel states.

He carefully

excluded the border states and areas remaining loyal to the Union from
trade interdiction.

Neither this exclusion nor the licensing of trade

with areas of the Confederacy occupied by Union forces proved of tremen
dous significance in opening avenues of trade during the first year of
the war.

Southerners preferred to burn their cotton rather than

15
relinquish it to the North, and the Union had little economic or military
power to prevent the destruction.

Early in the war, federal policies

restricting commercial intercourse varied sharply from department to
1

department.

Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton echoed the legal theorists

in his efforts to ban all trade, but Secretary of State William H.
Seward believed commercial intercourse with the South was essential to
the Union cause both domestically and abroad.

Apart from the August

1861 regulations, the administration made no serious effort to state a
comprehensive policy.

According to Futrell, "The system of theoretical

non-intercourse whereby commerce depended on supposedly exceptional
executive licenses had never been strictly enforced."

33

By 1862, however, the question of trade assumed more importance.
Spring of that year marked the fall of New Orleans and Memphis—
victories that brought Union armies into contact with the southern
cotton belt.

On May 12 Lincoln opened the blockaded ports of Beaufort,

North Carolina, Port Royal, South Carolina, and New Orleans.

In opening

commercial intercourse with these ports, the president only prohibited
trading in contraband of war.
opened to restricted trade.

By November, Norfolk had also been
The North needed cotton, and by late 1862

and 1863 many Southerners were willing to sell their crop to the first
v
buyer. 34

Determined to regulate the growing trade, Congress passed acts in
May of 1862 and March of 1863.

The 1862 "Act to Provide for the Collec

tion of Duties on Imports, and for other Purposes" added to the regula
tory powers granted the Secretary of the Treasury in 1861.

This supple

ment authorized treasury agents to refuse clearance to any vessel laden
with goods destined for a foreign or domestic port whenever there was

16
reason to believe that any of those goods might be transported to places
under the insurgents' control.

Any vessel refused a permit which

attempted to depart for any port was subject, along with its cargo, to
forfeiture to the United States.

35

The act stated further that following

the issuance of a permit granting a vessel passage to either a domestic
or foreign port, the collector was required to obtain bond from the
vessel's owner in an amount equal to the value of the cargo.

Such a

bond was to be given as insurance that the cargo would be delivered to
its stated destination and not be used to aid the insurrectionists.
The Treasury secretary was authorized also to prohibit and prevent trans
portation in any vessel of any goods.

In essence, the May 1862 act

empowered the secretary to require reasonable security that goods, wares,
or merchandise would not fall into the hands
The Captured and

of

Abandoned Property Act of

the insurgents.
the following year sought

to control an area of

illicit trade that had flourished despite the

earlier regulations.

The legislation passed on

instituted to deal with captured property.

March 12, 1863,was

It authorized the Secretary

of the Treasury to appoint agents to collect captured and abandoned
property in parts of the Confederacy occupied by Union forces.

Such

property did not include any goods used, or intended to be used, for
waging war against the United States, such as arms, ordnance, ships,
steamboats, and "the furniture, forage, military supplies, or munitions
of war."

In actuality, the act pointed at the illegal trading in cap

tured stores of privately-owned cotton.

All goods collected would be

sold at auction for the benefit of the United States.

Agents were

instructed to keep thorough accounts of all property collected, and any
agent found allowing insurrectionists' property into the United States

17
was to be charged with a misdemeanor.

36

The Senate passed this bill knowing that cotton had come into the
Union from the Confederacy, often brought in by those directly in charge
of defending the Union cause.

Senator Lyman Trumbull (111.) called for

governmental confiscation of cotton as the army advanced through Con
federate territory because it had been "a source of great demoralization
and injury to the army that officers and privates and citizens have been
permitted to go down as our Army advances and speculate in cotton, as
has been charged. . . . [W]e all know that the country is full of accusa
tions against men, otherwise of high character and standing in the
country, in consequence of their alleged speculations in cotton; and
charges are made that our soldiers have been used to advance the purposes
of these speculators."'^
On paper the regulations of 1862 and 1863 seemed quite extensive,
but in practice they did little to prevent illicit trade and further
speculation.

Lincoln revealed his awareness of this situation in a

proclamation issued in April of 1863.

This order reversed an earlier

proclamation exempting inhabitants of West Virginia and other loyal
areas within rebel states from trade prohibition:

"Experience has shown

that the exceptions made . . . embarrass the due enforcement of said Act
of July 13, 1861, and the proper regulation of the commercial intercourse
authorized by said Act with the loyal citizens of said States."

Thus,

the border states were included in the area under trade prohibition,
except, of course, in an instance of "license and permission of the
President.
Chase's report to Congress on the state of the finances for the year
ending June 30, 1863, reflected the confusing state of affairs.

He first

referred to his duty to regulate commercial intercourse in conformity
with the acts of July 13, 1861, May 1862, and March 1863:
has been found exeedingly arduous and perplexing.

"This duty

The subject is too

vast and complicated, the appetite for trade is too eager and exacting,
and the impatience of all restraint, however salutory or necessary, is
too great, to allow any hope of avoiding many and sometimes just
complaints."

39

Chase declared his observance of the duties outlined in the March
1863 act.

They included the prevention of supplies being carried into

districts controlled by rebels; the duty of allowing necessities to
reach inhabitants of areas in which the rebellion had been suppressed;
and the policy of supporting the efforts of loyal citizens to obtain
from within Union lines cotton, sugar, tobacco, tar, resin, and such
other rebel products for the benefit of loyal commerce.

To these ends

Chase had selected supervising agents to exercise the necessary powers
over commercial intercourse and had imposed licensing fees on permitted
trade to defray the costs of supervision.
In a subsequent report to Congress made at the end of 1863, Chase
indicated that an attempt had been made to simplify his agent system.
It was not the system, however, but the integrity of his agents that
needed bolstering.

Many agents could not resist the bribes offered by

speculators or the opportunities to engage in illegal trade themselves.
By 1864, the illicit cotton trade flourished despite efforts of more
scrupulous treasury agents and military officers.

In addition to this,

the volume of licensed trade was so great that the fees from the permit
made the regulatory system self-supporting.

According to A. Sellew

Roberts, "By Spring of 1864 enough cotton went north to provide for

19
manufacture of all the goods that could be sold at the prevailing prices
and it was thought that a surplus would be left for exportation."

A

similar laxness was evident in tradestores which had been established
in occupied districts for the purpose of supplying residents of a dis
trict with the necessities of life.

Despite regulations as to who

could manage the stores and the kinds and amounts of goods to be handled,
the plan was abused.^
Union military officers became more impatient as abuses continued.
Generals Grant and Sherman were particularly angered when the Secretary
of War approved the payment of gold for southern goods.

Treasury regu

lations forbade payment for cotton in specie rather than Union notes.
Not only did payment in gold hurt the Union balance of payments, it also
facilitated Confederate transactions of foreign soil.

The North wanted

cotton, however, and Lincoln seemed willing to ignore the means taken
to obtain it.

When specie payments continued, Grant pushed for total

government control of the cotton trade.

He urged Lincoln to convince

Congress to adopt a policy by which the government would buy cotton at
a fixed price and drive traders out of the war zone.
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The military leaders had some support in Congress, which was also
tiring of the advantages being taken of the licensing system.

As Ludwell

Johnson noted, "Congress had been investigating contraband trade and had
reached some painful conclusions.

’Under the permission to trade,1 said

^3
one member, 'supplies have not only gone in, but bullets and powder.’"
According to James Ford Rhodes, licensed exceptions had become the rule.
Lincoln began to formulate a new plan, but Congress acted first in July
1864, putting into effect measures that had been under debate since
passage of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of 1863.

The 1864
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act repealed Lincoln's right to license commerce with the South, but
qualified that repeal with some accompanying exceptions.

Loyal persons

residing within insurrectionary states would be supplied when within
the lines of actual United States occupation.

When necessary, persons

residing within those lines would be licensed to bring or send to market
in loyal states any products produced by their own or their employees*
labors.

Officers of the Treasury Department determined where and when

goods could be taken.

Finally, the act prohibited officers and soldiers

of the Union from dealing in any way with the property mentioned in the
act for profit or benefit to themselves, and it authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to detect and prevent frauds and abuses in trade.
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The act empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to place agents at
designated locations to purchase for the United States any products of
insurrectionary states.

Payment for goods was not to exceed the market

value at the place of delivery.

Agents were not to pay for these pro

ducts out of any fund other than that arising from property sold as
captured or abandoned, or purchased and sold under the provisions of this
act.

Property so purchased was to be sold at places designated by the

Treasury Department, and all money left after expenses had been paid was
to go into the Treasury.
This section of the bill occasioned much debate, as senators disagreed
over the degree to which cotton and other southern goods were essential
to the Union cause.

Senator Lazarus Powell (Ky.) was especially reluctant

"to turn this Government into a speculator and trader in sugar, rice,
cotton, and tobacco, or any other commodities."
had to exist, should be left to private citizens:

Such speculation, if it
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I know that if the Government wishes to buy these
things for its own use it has a right to go into the
market and do so, but that is not the object of this
bill. It makes these agents buyers of the goods
with a view to selling them again, trafficking in
them. What does this Government want with raw cotton?
. . . The object is to have it for resale, to make
money; to have the Government turn speculator. Pass
this bill, and my word for it these agents will be- ^
come pilferers and plunderers of the public Treasury.
Senator John Henderson (Mo.) likewise disapproved of the purchasing
agent section, and criticized it in terms of the nonintercourse policy
which he though implicit in war:
The end to be accomplished by the adoption of a section
of this character can certainly be best accomplished by
withdrawing entirely the blockade from the southern
ports, and then letting those people trade where they
desire to trade. That would be less objectionable than
this proposition; because besides allowing trade with
States in rebellion, under this section we have the
Government embarking as a great trader.
Describing the illicit trade already taking place along the Mississippi,
Henderson stated that this bill would only worsen the situation.
closed with an eloquent plea to prohibit intersectional trade:

He
"Those

men who think that this rebellion can be crushed otherwise than by force,
by military power, are laboring under a most egregious error.

There is

but

. . .

one way in which it can be put down, and that is by force.

Blockade the ports; blockade the Mississippi river; give them none of
the aid and encouragement that would be given by this bill."
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Senator Preston King of New York thought that commercial traffic
through military lines was of doubtful propriety, but he upheld the
Administration1s right to regulate that trade as it saw fit:
[T]he Administration has found that this trade and
intercourse exists, and, supposing it cannot be pre
vented, has come to the conclusion that it is desirable
to have it regulated by law. . . . If the trade is to
be continued, it is very proper that it should be
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under the direction and control of the Government
and of law, and I shall not interpose objections.
While,the permits issued by Lincoln and the Treasury Department had
caused havoc, King had faith in the governments ultimate control:
". . . great demoralization has resulted; very serious charges and impu
tation of speculation and money-making have grown out of it; and this
bill is an attempt on the part of the Government to remedy these evils
without discontinuing the traffic."
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Senator Collamer also feared a complete repeal of Lincoln's
licensing power, and he was instrumental in providing the exceptions
that the bill included.

Collamer agreed with the sentiment that holding

commercial intercourse with one's wartime enemy was a paradox, but he
referred to the 1861 act and the intentions with which the licensing
privilege had been passed:
As our Army went on . . . in the occupation of the
enemy's country. . . it was apprehended that inter
course might be needed to feed the towns and cities
in the rear of our armies; and the question immediately
arose whether that could be done consistently with the
law of nations, as we now had the United States in a
state of war with the insurrectionary States . . . .
[I]t was ascertained distinctly that by the law of
nations the power to declare war, in modern times,
within the last two hundred years at least, has been
considered among nations as a power to modify that
war; it may license intercourse with particular parts
and sections under peculiar circumstances.49
In the course of debate Senator Henderson slightly modified his earlier
position by agreeing with Collamer that some licensing of trade was
necessary.

He realized that total repeal had been urged "in consequence

of the numerous frauds committed by Treasury agents in the southern
States."

However, if trade were cut off entirely, both Confederate and

Union-occupied areas of the South would starve:
great wrong .because some men are dishonest?"^

"Are we to do a very

Senator John Ten Eyck (N.J.) agreed with Senator Lot Morrill (Me.),
the bill's sponsor, that the wrongs perpetrated by a continuation of
licensing would be worse than a total cessation of trade:
While we are looking to the protection and comfort of
the Union men and women who have suffered in consequence
of their fidelity to the ancient flag, we must not over
look the fact that we have prolonged their sufferings,
prolonged the rebellion, strengthened the arm of traitors
by allowing this very trade, in consequence of which not
only Union men and women but rebels of the deepest dye
have been fed and have had their pockets crowded with
greenbacks, by means of which they could carry on the
rebellion.
He supported the need for repeal with a claim that would be voiced long
after the occasion for wartime trade had ceased:

"I am greatly afraid

that in some quarters the movements of our armies have been directed more
with a view to carry on trade and procure the productions of the southern
country than to strike down the rebels and put rebels under their feet."^^
Morrill and his committee ultimately amended the licensing repeal,
but many senators continued to agree with Senator James Grimes of Iowa:
"My own impression is that either there should be an absolute, unqualified,
and unconditional exclusion of trade, or else every man should be permitted to trade who chooses to do so."
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The unforeseen result of this

legislation was just such permission.
As Merton Coulter noted, the intention of Congress was to stop com
pletely the commerce between the United States and the Confederacy.

The

private trader was to be eliminated and all commerce that was necessary
in the occupied districts was to be under government agents.

As Congress

soon discovered, however, these intentions were not realized.

The first

hint came with Treasury Secretary Fessenden's promulgation on September
24, of a set of rules approved by Lincoln on that same day.

These rules
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allowed any person who owned products in the Confederate lines (the
presumption being that they would be Confederates) .to bring them in to
a government agency and receive three-fourths of the market value of
those goods in New York, payable in greenbacks.

This procedure com

pletely nullified the law as Congress had intended it.

The amazement

of the Senate was without bounds when, on examining more closely it
found that Section 8 of the measure clearly warranted the new rules.
That section did indeed state that the Secretary of the Treasury could,
with the president’s approval, authorize agents to purchase for the
United States any products of the insurrectionary states.

Section 8

further outlined the secretary’s responsibility to declare the places
of purchase, and to set prices exceeding neither the products’ market
value at their place of delivery, nor three-fourths of their market
value in New York City.
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Many senators believed that the section had

been inserted fraudulently.

This was not the case, however; the Secretary

of the Treasury was responsible for the wording, which Congress enacted
without fully comprehending its meaning.

The Senate was dumbfounded

further when it discovered that its bill also authorized a presidential
order permitting a seller to purchase merchandise up to one-third of the
price received and to transport that merchandise under Treasury Department
protection to any location inside or outside the Confederacy.
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Ludwell Johnson claims that Lincoln made use of a law intended to
stop private trading in enemy territory in order to throw open such trade
to an unprecedented extent.

Treasury regulations then in effect abso

lutely prohibited commercial intercourse across Union lines and forbade
the issuance of Treasury permits for any areas under Confederate control.
But Treasury agents could not prevent products from being brought into
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Union lines from Confederate territory.

All they could do was to refuse

to issue permits to take goods out of those lines.

The export of property

to the Confederacy was taken care of by executive order.
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Johnson, Coulter, and Futrell agree on the outcome of the combined
"regulations:"

trade between the North and South was thrown wide open.

The title of Futrell*s chapter describing the resulting trade is appro
priate— "Lincoln Opens the Flood-Gates, 1864-1865."

By March of 1865

Lincoln signed approximately forty orders authorizing private cotton
sales to the government.

These acts were followed by a steady opening

of blockades as the Union controlled more and more of the South.
Congress took steps to repeal Section 8, but by the time of its
January 1865 debate on the subject, such efforts were of little con
sequence.

Senator Collamer echoed the surprise of many Congressmen in

hearing that Congress "had actually passed a law for trading by the
Government with the people of that country for their produce."
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He

demanded a repeal of the offending section on the grounds that its enact
ment had provided almost uninhibited intersectional trade:
I ask, why did we declare the blockade? It was to
keep the southern people from selling their great
quantity of cotton and getting money for it from for
eign nations, and having thereby the sinews of war.
Would it not be strange if we should ourselves say in
the face of the world, "All that was a mere pretense;
we will buy their produce; we will pay them money for
it, we will give them the sinews of war?" It would
be the strangest anomaly under the heavens .^7
Collamer then cited a letter written to him by General Canby, who was an
officer in charge of the Mississippi Department, stationed in New Orleans:
Cotton speculators in the Mississippi Valley have a
prospective and hope to have an actual interest in
every bale of cotton within the rebel lines; they
know that expeditions within the enemy*s country are

followed by the capture of cotton, or its destruction
by the rebels to prevent its falling into our hands;
hence it is to their interest to give information to
the rebels of every contemplated movement. . . . I
have now several speculators, who were captured in
the enemy*s country, awaiting trial . . . for giving
information to the enemy. But the punishment
of these
men is no compensation for the evil they have
occa
sioned, and will not secure us from future disasters
from the same cause.58
Though by then of little practical importance, the fundamental
disagreement that had plagued the Union’s attitude toward intersectional
trade reasserted itself in one of the last debates of the war.

Senator

Henry Wilson (Mass.) agreed that corrupt trading practices had to be
abolished, but he also continued to defend the need to obtain cotton:
"It is . . . of vital importance to the finances of the country, to
the industry of the people, to obtain cotton if we can do so without
giving aid to the rebel authorities."
stating
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Senator Grimes responded by

that it was impossible to obtain cotton without helping the Con

federates:

"The Senator from Massachusetts says the cotton must be got

out of the rebel lines. . . . [T]he only way in which it can be safely
got out of that country . . .

is by fighting it out, never by trading

it out. . . . Either let us carry on this war as war, or else let us
disband the Army and let the Treasury undertake to trade us through the
war.
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The two factions continued to the end.

Charles Sumner (Mass.)

supported Wilson’s desire to obtain cotton, finding it necessary "not
merely to the business of the country, but to its foreign exchanges, its
finances, its national credit."
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Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, on the

other hand, thought that any hopes of trading with Southerners without
at the same time providing aid for the Confederate cause were delusory.
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The Union’s attempt to trade was "an endeavor to do that which was never
attempted in any other country, or at any other time; and that is to
carry out the idea that you may fight an enemy and trade with him at
the same time.

It is a paradox, a solecism, a thing that never entered

the brains of any other people, in the world.11 The consequences of
such a policy would undoubtedly be grim:
No investigation has yet fathomed that sink of iniquity,
that sewer of corruption, that has been laid open here
by the Government. . . . It is corrupting everybody
that has come within the circle of its influence. . . .
Senators talk about having cotton, say we must have it,
and that it will sink the price of gold in the market.
It may have that effect; but it sinks your honor faster
than it sinks the premium on gold.62
Wade closed debate on Section 8 (its repeal was defeated) with a state
ment showing the lesson that some, at least, had learned from the Union
practice of licensing intersectional trade:
The evil that you cannot guard against is that these
traders go on to the line, or as near as may be to the
line between the two enemies, and induce the enemy to
come in and trade, and they bring their cotton, and
the trader takes contraband articles of war to them,
and thus enables them to keep up the war. Thousands
of our men have fallen victims to this trade, as is
proven by all the military officers with whom I have
conversed along the line. You cannot guard against
this abuse. . . . It is idle, nugatory, and vain to
talk about regulating a trade of this kind. It cannot
be done, and that is the evil. You must stop this trade
with the enemy, or you must submit to this a b u s e . 63
By the time that Wade made his March 1865 plea, the damage had been
done.

Although Lincoln’s proclamation did not go into effect immediately,

restrictions aimed against intersectional trade relaxed steadily in the
last months of conflict.

This development did not please Grant, who

protested against the sale of food to the Confederates under cover of
Treasury permits.

Lincoln authorized him to disregard all trading permits
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but trade between the sections continued.
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Some Union spokesmen rather

welcomed than resisted the growth of intersectional commerce.

In a

letter written to Lincoln on May 5, 1865, Attorney General James Speed
explained that he had no objections to the infamous Section 8.
Speed first referred to the enlargement of the presidential licensing
power that the 1864 act had provided-— Lincoln*s new ability to license
trade between persons residing or living within insurrectionary districts.
Section 8 gave the president the power to review the Treasury Secretary*s
equally new authority to purchase products of insurrectionary states.
It was now within the discretion of the president "to withhold his
approval of such purchases, thus keeping in the hands of the President
complete control over the subject of trade between the loyal and disloyal,
and of the disloyal amongst themselves."

Speed believed that the

allowances made for presidential discretion should be large, "so as to
bring trade to as near the point of untrammeled freedom as is consistent
with public safety."
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Speed’s emphasis throughout his letter on the importance of presi
dential discretion made it apparent that he regretted the need to regu
late trade at all:

"The trade can be left as free, or made as limited,

as the President may deem expedient for the public good and safety. . . .
As it is greatly desired that the intercourse should be as free as
possible, there need be but few rules, and they as simple as possible."
Speed’s reference in the next passage to the 1864 legislation is
especially revealing of the attitude that may have tended to excuse
encroachments upon trade restrictions:
This statute, unfortunately, seems to have been framed
in reference to a state of actual and active hostility.
But it is the law, and we must conform to its provisions
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until it is repealed, or it shall be proclaimed that
the rebellion has been suppressed. The necessities
of the southern people, and an exhibition of returning
loyalty, should make us construe it as much for their
advantage as we possibly c a n . 66
Lincoln did not resist formulating a liberal interpretation of the
statute, and seemingly he had few qualms about exercising his powers of
discretion.

The final wartime orders of Lincoln and Andrew Johnson

opened blockaded ports.

On August 29 Johnson issued an order that re

moved all trade restrictions between the North and the South.
Confederate policies toward interbelligerent trade were no less con
fused than their federal counterparts.
federate policy as haphazard:

Ludwell Johnson described Con

"Rather than evolve a policy, the Confed

eracy groped its way uncertainly through a thicket of unforeseen diffi
culties and disappointed expectations, grasping at one expedient after
another.

There was a wide gap between law and practice, and poor coor-

dination between, and even within, the executive departments."
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Southerners were aware of the demoralization of soldiers and citi
zens caused by trading with the North.
tailment of trade would hurt the enemy.

They also realized that a cur
The deprivation resulting from

prohibition might harm the South more than the Union, however, as the
Confederate states depended on the northern states for foodstuffs and
other necessities of life.

Thus, a prohibition of trade might dampen

rather thfan boost Confederate morale.
These and other factors contributed in the South, as they had in
the North, to the development of a confusing set of statutory laws and
equally confusing interpretations of those laws.

With an act passed on

May 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress prohibited the exportation of
cotton except through the seaports of the Confederate states.

Southerners
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burned a great deal of their cotton during the early phases of the war
to prevent its capture by Union forces and to increase its value.

Cotton

was by far the most valuable commodity the South had with which to obtain
necessary war supplies.

The Confederacy wanted to confine commerce to

England and France, but the amount of cotton that could be shipped to
these countries through the blockade did not provide the many manu
factured goods needed by the Confederacy.

Moreover, many of the good

cotton regions were closer to federal lines and river points of ship
ment than to the European shipping ports.

These avenues of commerce

all pointed to the North, and despite the statutory prohibition, trade
between the sections began.
This commerce with the enemy brought complaints to the War Depart
ment at Richmond, although the department had earlier authorized certain
citizens in Mobile to trade cotton for supplies at Union-controlled New
Orleans.

Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin had given cotton permits

to Confederate citizens to trade with Yankees on the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts after the commissary-general reported that northern supplies were
essential to keep the army from starving.
Secretary of War George W. Randolph, agreeing that some interbelli
gerent trade was necessary, reported his findings to President Jefferson
Davis.

Randolph was of the opinion that the statutes did not forbid the

government’s trading with the enemy.

No principle of public law pro

hibited such trade, which was a common occurrence in European wars.

Com

merce with the enemy was an evil, but a lesser one than starvation of the
armies.

He advised, therefore, that contracts be made with northern

citizens for bacon, salt, blankets, and shoes, payable in cotton.
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Both

sections needed interbelligerent trade, but the South’s needs were more
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urgent.
Davis refused to voice wholesale approval or disapproval of trade
with the North, but he did authorize the trading of cotton for salt with
a French commercial house.

Davis stipulated that none of the cotton

should go to any port of the enemy, but since the seat of the French
trade was New Orleans, such trafficking could not continue without
General Butler’s permission.

(Butler was then in command of the city,

and was active in encouraging interbelligerent commerce.)

Thus, although

Davis did not give his formal consent to making trading arrangements
with the enemy, he "suffered them to be made."
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James Seddon, who became Secretary of War on November 21, 1862,
followed the policy of his predecessor by entering into contracts with
parties inside federal lines in order to get necessary supplies.

Many

contracts were made in the departments of Mississippi and East Louisiana,
where John C. Pemberton was the general in command.

Opposed to such

trade, Pemberton received authorization from Davis to stop all commerce
except the forwarding of cotton to pay for articles already received.
The contracts were annulled, but the illicit trade continued.

Rhodes

writes that commercial intercourse went forward under a quasi-authority
which winked at illegalities for the sake of the general good, or which
countenanced trade because the officers in charge were secretly interested
in it.

The southern story bears a striking resemblance to the northern

account of interbelligerent commerce.

As Rhodes put it, "The history of

the traffic from Southern is like that from Northern sources, a tale of
demoralization and corruption as well as vacillation, but the South being
the invaded country the taint there infected people as well as soldiers
and officers."^

A member of the House of Representatives from Mississippi

expatiated on the sorry consequences of illicit commercial traffic:
The classes engaged in this nefarious traffic, to
hid its enormity, would say that it was for the good
of our people; that they were buying articles of
necessity; that they were supplying the people with
shoes, salt, etc. It was not so. If these men, who
are trading with the enemy had been true to their
specious professions every man and child in the
Confederacy would have a half-dozen pairs of shoes
and the country would be knee-deep with salt. The
evil has produced great dissatisfaction among the
people.
General Leonidas Polk wrote to Davis from Alabama that planters and
citizens resorted to many measures to sell their cotton to the enemy—
even to bribing the guards to let them pass through the lines.

Polk was

opposed to all trade, and thought that the only way to prohibit it was
to authorize governmental possession of all cotton by purchase or impress
ment.

This policy was not adopted by the Confederate government.

As was

the case in the North, opinions and practices regarding trade continued
to vary within the Confederacy.

Very harsh measures might have stopped

the illicit trade, but Davis did not choose to authorize such repression.
Indeed, Jefferson Davis found it hard either to prevent or permit
interbelligerent trade.

In August 1864, Davis vested the Treasury

Department with responsibility for the cotton trade.
never received a fair
branch

The new policy

test, however, as Union advances were makingevery

of Confederate administration increasingly difficult.

Davis was

clearly reluctant to exercise the executive discretion that Lincoln
practiced so freely.

The Confederate president telegraphed a general in

Mississippi that he had no power to authorize a certain trade desired
with the enemy.

Secretary of War Seddon exercised less caution:

law prohibits such permits.

’"The

Where the necessity is apparent and urgent

I see no alternative but toleration of the trade to the extent of such
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a necessity.
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Rhodes concludes that interbelligerent trade was of greater advan
tage to the Confederacy than to the Union.

The real advantage, if any,

was to a few enterprising individuals rather than to either section as
a whole.
losses

Interbelligerent trade helped fuel a war that inflicted great
upon both sides; in itself the trade spurred neither a Union

victory nor a Confederate defeat.

The story of Louis A. Welton depicts

with accuracy the true impact of illicit trade during the Civil War.
Welton was born a Northerner, but he was captured in Confederate guise
when he attempted to import northern goods into the South:
Welton was merely one of a multitude of Americans who
found themselves in the midst of a war which they had
never wanted but which nevertheless made preemptory
demands on their allegiance. Feeling no strong
loyalty to either section, they threaded their way
through their personal interests, sometimes hindered
by the War, often helped by it, but never really
involved in the emotions of the great struggle that
enveloped them.74
The picture of Civil War trade— both from a northern and a southern
perspective— is a difficult one to paint.

Both sides passed laws first

to prohibit and then to regulate interbelligerent trade.

But neither

side possessed the strength of conviction needed to control interbelligerent
commerce.

One can argue that pressing needs made one side’s trading

practices more excusable than the other’s, but though illicit trade was
practiced by both sides, it served neither cause well.
If any overview of the northern position can be drawn, it appears
that the Union attitude toward commercial intercourse with the South went
through four phases.

The first two years of war marked an attempt to

follow legal precedents, with the administration and Congress prohibiting
all commerce except humanitarian relief and trade authorized by presidential
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license.

In 1863, a new dimension was added through the authorization

of Treasury agents to trade northern money and supplies for the needed
cotton.

In 1864, specific purchasing locations replaced the agent

system.

It was not until 1865, when victory was assured and the demand

for cotton stabilized, that the administration permitted the military
to follow the restrictions it had wanted throughout the war.

By that

time, however, Union victory was certain and trade prohibition seemed
something of a joke.
Several Union military and congressional leaders thus emerge as
rather ineffective proponents of rigid trade interdiction.
during the war was there complete prohibition of trade.

At no time

Some on the

Union side judged Lincoln harshly for his policies; others agreed with
him that a supply of cotton was essential for the Union cause.

It can

be argued that the president employed his discretionary power within
proper jurisdiction, though some accused the executive of encroaching
dangerously upon legislative powers.

The purpose here has not been to

judge but merely to present federal statutes concerning the status of
interbelligerent trade during the Civil War.

The presidential orders

and congressional enactments focused on the two exceptions to prohibition
cited by Wheaton and the other theorists mentioned earlier.

Some Congress

men balked at any degree of intersectional commerce, but their voices
were drowned out by those who succeeded in elevating the licensing
privilege into a legal principle in its own right.

It remains to be

seen whether the highest court in the land would acknowledge the legality
of these exceptions, or revert to a more conservative interpretation of
the practice of trading with the enemy.
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CHAPTER II
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE WARTIME TRADE

In examining the Supreme Court cases involving instances of inter\

belligerent Civil War trade, it is important to consider three factors
that have influenced all decisions.
in a vacuum.

The Supreme Court has never operated

The justices bring to the bench their personal backgrounds

and attitudes, and while in office are never wholly removed from the poli
tical pressures of the day.

While most justices are highly trained in the

law, they are nevertheless confronted with cases that compel them to draw
upon the more subjective resources of individual judgment and interpretation.
The two courts that decided the Civil War trade cases must be consi
dered in light of these influences.

The Taney Court, the first to issue

a wartime decision, was led by a chief justice largely out of step with the
prevailing political attitudes.

Roger B. Taney’s dissent in the Prize

Cases decision revealed his narrow view of the proper realm of executive
wartime action.

The infamous Dred Scott decision, also rendered by his

Court, affirmed Taney’s narrow interpretation of the law.

The opinion also

increased his unpopularity with liberals such as Lincoln.
In his lengthy work on the Taney Court, Carl Swisher stated that it
fell upon evil times not because of Taney’s Jacksonianism or his lack of
ability, but because his Court was caught in the pressures of sectional
conflict.

” . . . i n the time of civil war the strident and clamorous voice

of Mars too often drowned out the voice of the law, with its stress upon
reason and rightness rather than upon ruthless power, and little deference
39
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was accorded to judicial spokesmen.

To a considerable degree the execu/

tive won dominance in matters which in other times would have been left
to the courts."^
Taney's successor, Salmon P. Chase, and the Chase Court proved more
amenable to the popular mood, thanks largely to Lincoln’s appointive powers.
Five of the nine Supreme Court justices who served throughout most of the
Civil War and all of Reconstruction were Lincoln appointees.

Noah Swayne,

Samuel Miller, David Davis, and Stephen Field were Lincoln choices, and the
president selected Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase to succeed
Taney as chief justice.

The new members of the Supreme Court were young,

and after 1867 none of the justices was southern.

All of Lincoln’s appoin

tees played significant roles in antislavery politics and loyally supported
the war.

Support of the war indicated support of Lincoln as well.

words of Charles Haines, "It was a court composed of a

In the

Republican majority

that gave its support and sanction to the extraordinary military powers
assumed by President Lincoln."

n

Such sanction, however, did not preclude

dissent and varying interpretations from arising among the nine justices.
What the Court pronounced "in contemplation of the law" was affected by
the outlook of the individuals who sat on the Bench and did this contem3

plating.

Even at the war's end, the Supreme Court revealed discord, as

Justice Miller wrote to his brother-in-law in 1868:
The political climate looks to me more gloomy than it
has ever looked. I never thought a separation by success
of the rebellion the worst misfortune that could occur.
But in the threatened collision between the Legislative
branch of the government and the Executive and Judicial
branches I see consequences from which the cause of free
government may never recover in my day. The worst fea
ture I now see is the passion which governs the hour
in all parties and all persons who have controlling influ
ence. In this the Supreme Court is as fully involved as
the President or the House of Representatives.4
A potential source of the Supreme Court’s division could have been
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its need to interpret Civil War statutes and executive proclamations.
The Chase Court possessed the power of statutory interpretation— the
authority to interpret federal statutes and executive orders.

In judg

ing the laws passed to govern interbelligerent trade, however, this
ihterpretory power seemingly led to little of the dissension and passion
noted by Miller.

None of the trade decisions considered the constitution

ality of the congressional or presidential measures taken to regulate
commercial intercourse with the South.

The judges, almost as one, upheld

these measures as legitimate applications of international law.
This chapter will discuss only those cases involving an exchange
of goods across the military lines of the North and the South.

The con

clusion based upon the entire collection of cases is -that the Supreme
Court was well aware of the strict intentions that lay beneath the often
laxly-enforced congressional acts.

Almost every opinion began with a

reference to the principle of international law that forbade commercial
intercourse between enemies during war.

Was this reliance on international

law a shield with which to avoid considering the legitimate extent of con
gressional and legislative power?

A partisan Supreme Court may have been

reluctant to raise such questions.

Its view of the picture of Civil War

trade and the controlling measures taken may also have been affected by
the timing of the decisions.

The Supreme Court, seeing Reconstruction

as a time to heal wounds rather than cause new factions, may have sought
in its support of legislative and executive powers a return to a unified
central government.

Whatever its motives, the Supreme Court used inter

national law to defend both congressional prohibition and executive li
censing of northern trade with the South during the Civil War.
Several instances of intersectional trade that came to the Court's
attention resulted from illegal transportation of merchandise by water.
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The Reform (1865), The Sea Lion v. The United States (1868), and The
United States v. Lane (1868), arose from voyages in which a loyal vessel
attempted to secure a cargo in Confederate territory and transport these
goods back to Union territory.

In each instance Union officials confis

cated the cargo, and in each case the defendant's appeal of the confis
cation to the Supreme Court proved futile.
The significance of The Reform rests upon a congressional act passed
on February 13, 1862, that appropriated various moneys for the purchase
of cotton and tobacco seed.

This money was to be distributed to buyers

by the Treasury Department with the stipulation that they purchase cotton
as far north as possible, and only in areas where cotton was grown.

This

appropriation made no mention of weakening the earlier prohibition of trade.
On March 7, 1862, William Hodges of Washington received a license to
carry cotton seed from any point on the waters of Virginia emptying into
the Chesapeake Bay to the port of Baltimore.

The Treasury Department li

cense required that Hodges execute a bond of $200,000 as assurance that he
would not transfer any cargo to or from Baltimore or Virginia besides
that needed by the crew for one trip.. Unwilling to pay such a bond, Hodges
never used the license.

The day after its issuance, however, he received

a letter from the Secretary of Interior authorizing him to procure a cargo
of seed in Virginia and to bring it to Baltimore without posting bond.
Accompanying the letter was an endorsement of Navy Secretary Gideon
Welles promising protection to Hodges \ cargo in waters under United States
military control.
To obtain the seed Hodges hired a man named Penniman, who loaded The
Reform with miscellaneous cargo "well-suited to a blockaded region" in
order to execute the purchase.

The Reform cleared from Baltimore for

Alexandria, a legal and unblockaded destination, but then she set sail
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for Urbanna, on the Rappahannock River approximately 100 miles south
of Alexandria— a district then in insurrection against the United States.
Shortly thereafter United States revenue officers seized the vessel and
libelled it for forfeiture in the Federal District Court of Maryland.
Penniman admitted to undertaking the voyage, but defended his action
on the grounds that it was authorized by the interior secretary's letter
and the Navy Department's endorsement.

He stated that General John A.

Dix (the region's military commander) knew of his Urbanna destination and
understood that the delicate nature of his voyage necessitated the pre
tense of clearing for Alexandria.

At the time of the congressional act

of 1862, Union troops occupied no part of the cotton-growing territory.
The act specified only that purchases be made as far north as possible.
Penniman further defended his voyage on the ground that Urbanna was the
only place that satisfied that specification.
The district court dismissed the libel, and when the federal circuit
court upheld the decision the United States appealed to the Supreme Court.
An interesting aspect of the case is that Chief Justice Taney was in the
circuit court that dismissed the libel.

Taney remained consistent in his

position until his death, and viewed the enlargement of executive and con
gressional authority embodied in the trading acts of July 1861, May 1862,
and August 1862 with an unfriendly eye.

"A civil war, or any other, does

not enlarge the powers of the Federal Government over the States or the
£

people, beyond what the compact has given to it in time of war."
Taney interpreted the July 13, 1861, statute to mean that liability
of goods and of vessel "adheres to them while they remain. . . in transitu
between the forbidden places and no longer."

Charles Fairman reasoned

that Taney here was analogizing with the rule in prize law that holds that
the neutral ship breaching blockade is purged if it completes the voyage
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without being caught.
into his own lines.

The spy may not be penalized if he has returned
Those are the rules, but a sovereign declaring law

for persons who owe it obedience is not playing games.

One charged with

transporting stolen goods does not escape" punishment by showing that he
has deposited his load before the arrest was made.^

The chief justice

consistently took, "with deep sincerity," the very narrowest view of the
power to fight the war for the Union.

8

case finally reached the Supreme Court.

A new viewpoint reigned when the
Taney’s narrow construction of

the nonintercourse law was rejected unanimously by the Supreme Court in
The Reform.
The details of that rejection will be revealed with those of Sea Lion
and US. v . Lane^
however,

as the three decisions contain similar arguments.

the facts of those cases.

sultedfrom a permit issued

First,

The Sea Lion v. The United States re

on February 16, 1863, by Treasury agentG. S.

Denison (and approved by Major-General N. P. Banks) to a New Orleans com
mercial firm allowing that company to bring cotton to New Orleans from
Confederate-occupied areas.

Rear Admiral David G. Farragut was in command

of the blockading force on that coast.

He endorsed the Banks permit but

instructed his commander of the Mobile blockade to investigate any ship
coming out of Mobile to make sure it conformed to trade regulations.
Farragut*s instructions were as follows:
Should any vessel come out of Mobile and deliver itself
up as the property of a Union man desiring to go to New
Orleans, take possession and send it into New Orleans for
an investigation of the facts and if it be shown to be as
represented, the vessel will be considered a legal trader,
under the general order permitting all cotton and other
produce to come to New Orleans. 9
Agents of the New Orleans firm went to Mobile in late March 1863,
bought The Sea Lion, and loaded it with a cargo of cotton and turpentine.
The vessel left Mobile on May 8, 1863, under the Confederate flag.

The
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Sea Lion was cleared for the destination of Havana rather than New
Orleans by the Confederate officers— a ruse that enabled the ship to
leave Confederate waters with cargo intact.

This ruse did not prevent

Union blockade officers from obeying the instructions issued by Farragut.

They boarded The Sea Lion shortly after she set sail for Mobile.

Upon investigation the ship was found to be an illegal trader, and she
and her cargo were taken to Key West and libelled in the District Court
for Southern Florida as prize.
The claimants appealed the condemnation in the Supreme Court, and
defended their voyage on the basis of the Banks permit.

They stated

that their destination was indeed New Orleans, and offered their volun
tary surrender to the blockaded fleet as proof of that fact.
The United States v. Lane likewise involved a license issued to
authorize a voyage within insurrectionary areas.

During the war George

Lane contracted with treasury agent Hanson A. Risley at Norfolk, Virginia,
for the purchase of cotton stored on the Chowan River in North Carolina,
an area controlled by the Confederacy.

In addition to the Risley con

tract, the commander of the military district gave Lane an assurance of
safe conduct given by the military commander.

Risley appointed a sub

agent to sail with the vessel and to be in charge of its cargo.

He

instructed this agent not to deliver those goods to Lane until the latter
had delivered cotton worth three times the cargo’s value to the vessel.
The ship travelled to the Chowan River without hindrance, and Lane
delivered the cotton to the sub-agent as agreed.

On the return trip to

Norfolk, however, Union officials seized both vessel and cargo in the
inland waters of North Carolina.

They were released but seized again

before reaching Norfolk, and Union officials sent the vessel to Washington,
D.C.

The property was libelled in the Supreme Court of the District of
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Columbia, but no proceedings were taken against the cotton and it even
tually was restored to Lane.

Upon repossession he sold it in New York.

Rapidly falling prices meant that this sale of the cotton yielded far
less than if the voyage had not been interrupted.

Lane called upon the

United States to make good the loss caused by the conduct of its officers.
The court of claims ruled in Lane's favor, and the United States appealed
the decision.
The Supreme Court ruled against the traders in all three cases,
finding that each voyage involved trade illegalities.

The Court refuted

all of the points raised by Penniman in The Reform v. The United States.
The July 1861 nonintercourse act was valid throughout the war.

Thus,

the interbelligerent trade occurring during the war was still illegal
when the case was heard in 1865.

The Court further denied that the inter

ior secretary’s letter was sufficient authorization for Penniman’s voyage.
Since trade within insurrectionary states was strictly prohibited, com
merce conducted in rebel districts under United States control was only
to be permitted by a license issued by the president in accordance with
Treasury Department regulations.

The Court found that the 1862 appropri

ation for cotton seed was not a relaxation of these earlier restrictions.
Penniman’s voyage into an insurrectionary district was clearly illegal,
as was his attempt to justify such action with a license not issued by
the president.
Hodges was authorized only to procure cotton seed, and not to trans
port cargo to the place of destination or to bring back a cargo other than
seed.

The license not used by Hodges specified that

*the only permis

sible cargo would be that which the ship’s crew would use for one trip.
Although Hodges did not use the license granted him, he knew through its
stipulations that the variety of goods carried by The Reform constituted
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an illegal, and therefore condemnable cargo.

Reversing the circuit court

decree, the Supreme Court issued an order of forfeiture against the car
go and vessel.
The Court used many of the same grounds to uphold the condemnation
of The Sea Lion’s cargo. Drawing upon the principles established in
Jecker v. Montgomery, Justice Swayne found in 1868, as had Justice Daniel
in 1855, a premeditated violation of trade restrictions.

The Sea Lion

was fitted and loaded at Mobile during a time when that city was in enemy
territory and under blockade.

Clearance was signed for Havana, and Jus

tice Swayne found it hard to resist the conclusion that the vessel’s
crew left Mobile with two alternatives in mind.

One possibility was to

evade the blockading fleet and head for Havana.

In case of seizure, the

plan was to produce the Banks license and set up the pretext of a trip
to New Orleans.

Neither was a legal alternative.

As shown in

The Reform

v. The United States, the July 1861 act prohibited trade within enemyheld territory, which outlawed trade in Alabama.

Even if such a voyage

were permissible, Major-General Banks was not authorized to license any
exception to trade prohibition.

That power was solely an executive priv

ilege.
George Lane fared no better in 1868 than had the owners of The Reform
and The Sea Lion. Justice Davis wrote the opinion for the Lane case, and
in it reflected the legal viewpoint that served to govern the former de
cisions as well.
At the time the Lane contract purports to have been
made, this country was engaged in war with a formi
dable enemy, and by a universally recognized principle
of public law, commercial intercourse between states
at war with each other is interdicted. It needs no
special declaration on the part of the sovereign to
accomplish this result, for it follows from the very
nature of war that trading between the belligerents
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should cease. If commercial intercourse were allow
able, it would oftentimes be used as a door for inter
course of an entirely different character; and in
such a case the mischievous consequences that would
ensue can be readily foreseen. But the rigidity of
this rule can be relaxed by the sovereign, and the laws
of war so far suspended as to permit trade with the
enemy. . . . It being the rule, therefore, that busi
ness intercourse with the enemy is unlawful unless di
rectly sanctioned, the inquiry arises, whether there
was any law of Congress in force at the time that sanc
tioned this transaction.-^
In this paragraph lies a perfect example of the extent to which
Chase* s Court used international law to avoid challenging the concept of
Lincoln as sovereign, and to avoid questioning Congress* delegation of
power to the executive branch during the war.

The use of statutory

interpretation came next, as Davis examined the statutes thoroughly and
found no sanction for Lane*s activities.

Lane maintained that his li

cense to journey the Chowan River was authorized by the July 2, 1864,
act and its alleged relaxation of trade.

His contention that the law

conferred upon treasury agents a power to license trading within the
military lines of the enemy was not supported by either the act itself
or treasury regulations of July 29, 1864, which affirmed a prohibition
of commercial intercourse beyond United States military lines.

The sys

tem that authorized treasury agents to purchase products of insurrec
tionary states at certain locations did not carry with it the right to
establish such a place within enemy lines.

The Court also found nothing

in the September 1864 regulations issued by Treasury Secretary Fessenden
and approved by Lincoln inconsistent with continued prohibition.

The

eighth section stated that an agent should record an individual*s appli
cation to sell property, and request safe conduct for such party and
his necessary transportation to and from the location specified to the
purchasing agent.

Nothing in this rule allowed trading, that is, an
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exchange of goods or money, with the

insurrectionary areas.

The jus

tices viewed the sections limiting the presidential issuance of licenses
and requiring a strict recording of all transactions as further evidence
of Congress’s determination to enforce trade prohibition.
Davis, explaining the Court’s intentions, wrote that private trade
had hurt the war effort by 1864.
the government and many private

By this time, it was also known that
traders wanted certain southern products

brought within United States military lines.

Neither group, however,

wanted to jeopardize the Union’s military operations.
that a new system was needed to achieve both ends.

Congress realized

Accordingly, Congress

denied citizens all privileges of trading with the enemy, and instead
allowed the secretary of the treasury, with presidential approval, to
purchase products of the insurrectionary states through agents located
at trading posts within Union-occupied areas.
The secretary could not use the army to attract trade, and needed
inducements in order to get the insurgents to bring their products to
the agents.

The inducements offered were strong.

The treasury regula

tions promised Confederates that if they brought their cotton within
Union lines it would be purchased instead of seized.

Confederates were

also allowed to entrust someone to take their produce to the purchasing
agent and sell it for them.

Davis described the presidential order of

September 1864 as adding further enticement by promising Confederates
the ability to purchase any merchandise needed— except contraband of
war— up to one third of the value of the products sold by them.
addition, both party and property were promised safe conduct.

In
Davis made

no mention of the result of this promise— namely, that trade between
the sections was thrown wide open.
not as practiced.

He interpreted the law as written,

The Court understood that if private citizens of loyal
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states engaged in a venture like Lane’s, they would need, in order to
make the voyage remunerative, to exchange a cargo for southern products.
There was no authority to do this.

The president’s September proclama

tion only permitted the taking of return cargo, bought with part of the
proceeds resulting from a sale of products to a purchasing agent.

In

this act of statutory interpretation, Davis sought to close the door on
trade that was theoretically permissible under the wording of the con
troversial Section 8.
Risley was clearly acting beyond his authority when he made the
contract with Lane.

The voyage itself was illegal, as was Risley's

issuance of a trading permit.

Upon receiving a written application made

by an individual wishing to sell southern products, the agent’s power
was limited to issuing a stipulation to purchase, to providing a certi
ficate of the application made, and to requesting safe conduct for the
party and his property.

The purchasing agent had no right to negotiate

with anyone in regard to products.

Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed

the court of claims decision, and sent the case back to that court with
an order to dismiss Lane’s petition.
The Supreme Court’s determination to uphold the intention of the
original 1861 nonintercourse act here becomes evident.

Subsequent con

gressional efforts to limit trade were to be rigidly enforced by the
justices, even where other Union officials did not sympathize with com
plete prohibition.
licenses.

In all three cases, military officers granted illegal

The Court adhered to the 1861 act even in the face of the new

1864 system— a system interpreted by many to allow greater degrees of
interbelligerent trade.

However, The United States v. Lane shows that

the Court interpreted these new regulations as consistent with the prin
ciple of prohibition.

In this and many other decisions the heritage of
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international law removed from Court opinion any doubts caused by a con
fused Union attitude toward trade with the Confederacy. Thus, the issue
of the use of international law as a screen with which to avoid contro
versial topics is again of relevance.

Any mention of Lincoln's use of

executive powers to actually thwart wartime trade controls is studiously
avoided.

The Court proved itself again loyal to the Union cause, and

to the cause of reconstructing a strong national government.
The cases of Gay's Gold (1871) and The United States v. Mora (1879)
also involve instances of illegal water traffic, but these decisions
embodied a few new considerations as well.

An appeal from the Louisiana

Federal Circuit Court brought Gay's Gold to the Supreme Court's atten
tion.

The appeal resulted from the seizure of a package of gold in March

1864.

Special treasury agent George S. Denison found and seized the gold

on a steamer lying at New Orleans and about to go upriver.

The gold was

libelled in federal district court on the grounds that its transport to
an area under rebel control violated the nonintercourse acts of 1861 and
the resulting treasury regulations.

A claim for the gold was entered by

Edwards in the name of Gay, a merchant and planter living within
Louisiana's federal lines.

Gay's northern indentity and technical loy

alty to the United States were not in dispute.

The district court

found no proof that he had intended to violate the law.

The circuit

court reversed and condemned this decree, however, and Gay brought his
case to the Supreme Court.
Edwards claimed that the United States had no proof that the gold
was intended for any place under insurgent control.

Even if the money

was so intended, the case was not within the dictates of the 1861 non
intercourse act, as "acts visiting persons with forfeiture are to be
construed strictly.

. . . money is neither goods, wares, merchandise,
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or c h a t t e l s . M o r e o v e r ,

even if Gay had been guilty of some wrong

doing, his offense should have been obliterated at the time of the trial
by President Andrew Johnson’s December 1868 pardon.

This pardon restored

to those who had participated in the war all rights, privileges, and
immunities as stated by the Constitution.
Justice Miller’s opinion voiced little doubt that the gold had been
destined to be used for buying cotton in an insurrectionary district.
The fact that Gay, although a loyal citizen, did not come himself to New
Orleans and make an oath to his claim for the gold added further weight
to suspicions that the gold was going within rebel lines.

Justice Miller

also wrote that gold was well within the restrictions of the noninter
course act.
It is a well-known fact that in 1864 gold coin was an
article of merchandise, and bought and sold at fluc
tuating prices, and was the object of a large and active
traffic. It would be folly to say that the court could
not take notice of what all the world besides knew very
well; and we must, therefore, hold that gold coin in
package, carried from one person to another; and not used
for paying travelling expenses, when intended for an in
surrectionary district, was within the prohibition of
both statutes cited.12
The Court also held that Gay was not entitled to the gold under
Johnson’s pardon, as the terms of the proclamation were limited to per
sons who participated in the war, and offenses pardoned were "treason
against

the United States, or adhering to their enemies during the late

civil war."-

There was no

of any such offense.

pretense that Gay was such a person or guilty

The circuit court decree was affirmed and Gay’s

appeal denied.
In The United States v. Mora the act of interbelligerent commerce
involved did not bring the case to the Supreme Court’s attention.

The

case instead centered around a suit brought by the United States on a
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bond dated and executed March 4, 1863.

The bond was executed by the

collector at the port of New York as a condition precedent to a granting
of clearance to Sarah Marsh, a vessel laden with merchandise bound for
Matamoras, Mexico.

The New York collector of customs had acted under

regulations issued on May 23, 1862, by the secretary of the treasury,
that referred to the presidential proclamation modifying the blockade
of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans.

In accordance with that proc

lamation the collector was to refuse clearance to vessels bound for these
ports only if their cargoes contained contraband of war.

The collector

was also authorized to refuse clearance to ships intended for Confederate
ports, or if the vessel’s goods were in danger of falling into rebel
hands. Where the collector feared that wares shipped from New York might
be used to aid the insurgents, instructions required him to demand se
curity as a guarantee that the wares would not be transported anywhere
under insurrectionary control.

The collector of customs was also autho

rized to require bonds securing an adherence to the regulations concer
ning liquor, scrap metal, and hardware if the goods were destined for
ports where they might be reshipped to aid the insurrectionists.
Such bond was taken by the collector from Sarah Marsh, and with
good cause.

After

paying the bond, the ship’s captain sold part of

Sarah Marsh’s goods to Confederate military officials in Brownsville,
Texas, in April 1863.
Such a sale, however, was not the issue in The United States v.
Mora. The claimant in this case was Mora, owner of the Sarah Marsh. He
objected to the harsh conditions demanded by the bond, and sought reim
bursement of the money it exacted.

The federal circuit court sustained

his objection, and the United States appealed to the Supreme Court.
United States held that the bond was a reasonable amount, and stated

The
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that its payment was a voluntary undertaking by the defendant.

Mora,

however, objected to a bond double the amount of the value of Sarah
Marsh’s goods, and complained that its payment had not been voluntary.
Justice Bradley’s opinion reversed the ruling of the lower court.
The security required was proper, given the May 20, 1862, act of Congress
and May 23 treasury circular issued under it.

The secretary of the

treasury did not exceed his authority either in instructing the New York
collector to refuse clearance to suspect vessels, or in ordering the col
lector to require substantial security that the goods would not be trans
ported anywhere under insurrectionary control.
The Court ruled that a security of double the value of goods was
reasonable as were all the conditions of the bond.

The bond given in

this case required only what the law sought to secure.

If the shipper

chose to give bond in order to clear the goods, it was a voluntary act
and he had no grounds for complaint.

The defendant never tried to prove

that the collector had no basis for suspicion.

Had the government’s of

fer to prove that the goods did not reach Matamoras been accepted, the
resulting facts would have revealed their Brownsville destination, and
ample grounds to suspect Mora’s motives.
This case, like Gay’s Gold, showed the Supreme Court to be adamant
in its strict interpretation of the nonintercourse policy.

If any part

of a trade restriction was in line with statutory principles and those
of the law of nations governing Wartime trade, such a restriction was
viewed as well within legal boundaries.

The Court was therefore using

its power of statutory interpretation to uphold trade control, and not
to see in the wording of the statutes the opportunities to trade viewed
by others.
The next group of cases to be considered originated from illegal

55
attempts to purchase cotton during the war years.

The Ouachita Cotton

(1867) involved three appeals coming from the Illinois Circuit Court
regarding 395 bales of cotton seized during the war by a Union flotilla.
The cotton in question had been sold to the Confederate government in
1862, and paid for in Confederate bonds.

Three American parties residing

in New Orleans purchased a quantity of this cotton from the Confederate
government during the rebellion, and after their city of residence was
restored to federal jurisdiction.

All three left the cotton stored on

the Ouachita, Louisiana, plantation where it was grown.
Business partners Withenbury and Doyle received some of the crop in
August 1863 as payment for the Confederacy’s use of their two steamboats
during the war.

These men, Ohio citizens normally engaged in legal com

merce between New Orleans and Upper Georgia, maintained that the Confed
eracy compelled them to provide the use of their boats.
Leon Queyrous was a second recipient of some Ouachita cotton.
rous was a United States citizen and a New Orleans resident.

Quey-

In March

of 1864 he bought a load of the Ouachita cotton from a Confederate agent.
Queyrous ultimately sold his cotton to the French firm of Le More &
Company, but his title to the cotton was questioned in this case.
The third party involved in the Ouachita case was the Louisiana
State Bank.

The bank found itself with a large amount of Confederate

currency made worthless in New Orleans after the city’s capture by the
Union.

Two agents were authorized to take large amounts of that currency

within the rebel lines to buy cotton in 1863 with the result that the
bank became owner of some of the Ouachita crop.
Thus, all three purchases were made after New Orleans was restored
to the Union on May 6, 1862.

In April 1864 a United States gunboat flo

tilla sailed up the Ouachita River and found the cotton stored in a part
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of Louisiana under Confederate control.

The flotilla seized the Con

federate cotton and took it to Cairo where it was libelled in district
court as prize of war.

Such a seizure was authorized by the July 1861

act and by international law, which held that an enemy’s property may
"be taken as prize, according to the laws of war between adverse belli
gerents."

They then brought their case to the attention of the Supreme

Court.
Appeal was pursued against the Unites States on several grounds.
One was that the nonintercourse act of July 13, 1861, only ordered the
forfeiture of goods "coming from said state or sections into the other
parts of the United States, and all proceedings to such s t a t e . P r o 
perty could only be confiscated when involved in an act of transfer from
one section to another.

The appeal also stated that as long as rebels

held United States territory to the exclusion of U.S. laws and officers,
the citizens could sell or buy rebel property whether under individual
or government transaction, provided that transactions were not undertaken
with the intention and purpose of aiding that government in its unlawful
usurpations.
The Supreme Court ordered that the congressional prohibition of
trade overruled these lines of defense.

The July 1861 act stated that

commercial intercourse between the sections was illegal.

All three par

ties had violated this ruling by purchasing Confederate property while
claiming Union citizenship.
and April 1863 proclamations.

The Court also cited Lincoln’s August 1861
The President excepted New Orleans from

total interbelligerent trade interdiction, a relaxation which applied
only to trade practiced by presidential license.
These proclamations were made prior to either of the purchases of
cotton from rebel agents to which the bank and Queyrous traced their

57
titles.

The Court stated that the subjugation of New Orleans had been

completed on May 6, 1862, and from which date its citizens lay under the
same trade restrictions as those of loyal states.

Both the bank and

Queyrous claimed that they had been granted licenses to trade by military
authorities, but the Court declared all licenses other than those granted
by Lincoln to be null and void*

The Court also forbade the Confederate

payment of cotton to United States citizens was likewise forbidden.
claim of Withenbury and Doyle was also overruled.

The

The Court found all

three cotton purchases to be null and void, and upheld the Ouachita
seizure.
The Supreme Court was beset with many claims for cotton seized under
the aegis of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act shortly after the
war’s end.

The right to assert a claim to property two years after the

war ended first brought relevant cases to the court of claims.

Charles

Fairman reported that after it was established that claimant and govern
ment alike could plead their case before the Supreme Court, the construc
tion of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act became in the early 1870s
a significant branch of the Court’s work.^“*
Like the Ouachita case, those of Montgomery v. The United States
(1874) and The United States v. Lapene (1873) involved situations in
which New Orleans residents arranged to buy cotton within Confederate
territory from Confederate citizens.

In these cases the agreements to

purchase were made after the United States captured New Orleans.

Both

Montgomery and the Lapene firm transacted their business through agents,
but agents did not legitimate these transactions in the Supreme Court’s
eyes.

In both cases the U.S. military seizure of the cotton was upheld,

and the claimant’s title to the cotton denied.

The agencies created by

both Montgomery and Lapene originated at a time when they were legal, or
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when New Orleans was under Confederate control, but the purchases occurred
in each instance after the parties involved became residents of hostile
portions of the same states.

Both cotton purchases thus became transac

tions made with an alien enemy.
The Court mentioned the rules of international law in both cases.
Justice Strong wrote that the Montgomery firm’s right was "founded upon
an attempted purchase, during the war, from an enemy, of enemy’s property,
in direct violation of the acts of Congress."

Strong cited Theodore

Dwight Woolsey’s text on international law to support his finding that
an intermediary agent made the act of trade no less criminal an action.
’Nothing is clearer. . . than that all commercial
transactions of whatever kind. . . with the subjects
or in the territory of an enemy, whether direct or
indirect, as through an agent or partner who is neu
tral, are illegal and void. . . .’ The present case
exhibits a transaction not wholly within enemy’s
territory, but a sale from an enemy to a friend. If
that can be made through an agent, then the rule
which prohibits commercial intercourse is a mere
regulation of the mode of trade. It may be evaded
by simply maintaining an agency in the enemy’s terri
tory. In this way every pound of cotton or of sugar
might have been purchased by northern traders from
those engaged in the rebellion. . . . The contract
in this case contemplated the delivery of the su
gar, molasses, and rum at New Orleans, then within
the Federal lines. There, on its being weighed and
measured, payment was to be made to [the Montgomery]
agents. If this be allowed, the enemy is benefitted
and his property is protected from seizure or con
fiscation. 16
The Court again cited Woolsey in ruling against the plaintiff in
the Lapene case.

The purchase of cotton in the case "gave effectual aid

to the enemy by furnishing to them the sinews of war.
by the soundest principles of public law.

It was forbidden

The purchaser obtained no

ti

tle to the cotton, and has no claim against the [federal] government

for

its c a p t u r e . T h u s , while other Union spokesmen may have been hedging
on the question of trade with the Confederacy, the Supreme Court remained
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rigid in its adherence to the interdiction inherent in the law of nations.
Here again, the Court may have used international law to stop the devel
opment of other inquiries.

The Court was determined to uphold the war

time measures of Lincoln and Congress, and in an effort to avoid ques
tion or controversy may have tried to neutralize them in the foundation
of the law of nations.
Mitchell v. The United States (1874) and Desmare v. The United
States (1876) bring more elaborate considerations of domicile into simi
lar instances of illegal trade.

Mitchell was a Louisville resident who

spent a considerable portion of the war conducting various business trans
actions within the Confederacy.

He stored a large amount of cotton pur

chased during this period in Savannah, and protested its seizure when
the city was captured by Union forces.

The Desmare case concerned a New

Orleans resident who protested the seizure of cotton he had stored in
Louisiana.

The purchase of that cotton was made after New Orleans was

captured by the Union in 1862.

The Court ruled in both cases that the

claimants were domiciled within Union-controlled territory when they un
dertook their business transactions in the Confederacy.

Justice Swayne

cited the two previous cases as well as international law in writing the
Mitchell opinion.

These tenets of law also governed the Desmare case,

so Swaynefs Mitchell opinion applies to it.
At the time when Mitchell passed within the rebel lines
the war between the loyal and the disloyal states was
flagrant.
It speedily assumed the largest proportions.
Important belligerent rights were conceded by the
United States to the insurgents. Their soldiers when
captured were treated as prisoners of war, and were
exchanged and not held for treason. Their vessels when
captured were dealt with by our prize courts. Their
ports were blockaded and the blockades proclaimed to
neutral nations. Property taken at sea, belonging to
persons domiciled in the insurgent states, was uniform
ly held to be confiscable as enemy property. All these
things were done as if the war had been a public one
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with a foreign nation. The laws of war were applied
in like manner to intercourse on land between the
inhabitants of the loyal and the disloyal states. It
was adjudged that all contracts of the inhabitants of
the former with the inhabitants of the latter were
illegal and void. It was held that they conferred no
rights which could be recognized. Such is the law of
nations. . . as administered by courts of justice.18
Herein lies a rather subjective view of the trade controls enacted
during the Civil War.

Swayne rather blithely states that "the laws of

war were applied in like manner to intercourse on land," thus leading one
to assume that trade interdiction was the natural condition.
picture was not so neat.

The real

Swayne would also lead one to believe that a

"court of justice" has a formula for applying the law of nations to war
time crimes.

This may indeed have been the impression that Chase’s Court

was trying to convey.
In the Court’s eyes, the Civil War had a dual character.

Duality

carried with it the assumption that the Confederate sympathizers were
accorded belligerent rights, and were answerable to both international
and municipal law. Both sets forbade interbelligerent commercial inter
course.

In all five of the cases, contracts were made on invalid grounds,

and the trading practiced of a trespassing nature.
In at least one case, however, the question of just what consti
tuted an area under United States military control was not so clearcut.
In the case of Butler v. Maples (1869) the Court ruled on the matter of
how an area should be judged to be within the lines of federal occupa
tion so that a treasury agent could issue a permit to trade.

In this

case, the Court concluded that the grant of permit was in fact based upon
the realities of occupation.

In Butler v. Maples there was uncontra

dicted evidence that before the grant of a permit, Desha County, Arkansas,
had been evacuated by Confederate forces in their retreat toward the Red
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River and on into Texas.

No such forces existed within 150 to 200 miles

from Red Fork, in Desha County, so the military occupation of Union
forces extended over the region.
generally
papers.

The Court also held that the citizens

had taken the oath of allegiance, or had obtainedprotection

In addition, an authorized treasury agent

had granted a permit

to a Memphis firm— Memphis was then under federal control— to buy cotton
there.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that

the license had been legal.
The Court acknowledged that the grant of the permit may have in
volved technical improprieties, but it held that it
. . . was an exercise of the treasury agent’s judgment,
and a deduction from the facts known by him, that the
region over which the permit extended was within the
military lines. It is to be presumed that he acted right
ly, and as he could not lawfully grant the permit in the
absence of such military occupation, his grant of it
raised a presumption that the occupation existed.
It
established at least a prima facie case.
Referring to a similar case, The United States v. Weed, the Court added,
’The fact that the proper officers issued these permits
for certain parishes, must be taken as evidence that
they were properly issued until the contrary is estab
lished. ’ But a prima facie case, with nothing to rebut
it, is a case made out. If, then, what amounts to mil
itary occupation. . . i s necessarily a question of
law. . . and if there was nothing to rebut the presump
tion of fact arising from the grant of the permit, and
no contradiction or impeachment of the direct testimony
the court was justified in declaring, as matter of law,
that Desha County was within the lines of military occu
pation from the north, and that the contract was not
illegal.19
The Supreme Court therefore upheld the decision of the federal cir
cuit court in permitting the trade grant.

The Butler v. Maples decision

illustrated the power of judicial review, but a power that supported
executive and legislative policies as well as legal precedent.

The deci

sion also suggested some of the opportunities available to treasury
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agents to abuse their privileges.
The next set of cases involved the use and misuse of legitimate
trade licenses.

These cases were The United States v. Weed (1866),

Walker’s Executors v. The United States (1862), and McKee v. The United
States (1868).
In April of 1864, U.S. military authorities seized the steamer A.G.
Brown on two separate voyages— once while en route to Brashear City,
Louisiana, and once while in port at the same city on a return from ano
ther expedition.
lasses.

Both times the ship carried a cargo of sugar and mo

The two captures were combined into a single case, and litiga

tion was pursued in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.
C. A. Weed filed a claim in the district court for the sugar and
molasses involved in the first capture.
yal U.S. citizen from New Orleans.

He claimed himself to be a lo

Weed had purchased the property in

the Parish of St. Mary, Louisiana, under the authority of a treasury
agent's license, and was transmitting it to New Orleans when the goods
were seized.

F. Blydenburgh filed a claim for the sugar of the second

capture, saying that he bought it under license from the Louisiana par
ish of St. Martin’s.

The district court dismissed the libel and or

dered restitution of the property, and the United States brought its ap
peal to the Supreme Court.
The claimants defended their action on the grounds that neither
voyage extended beyond the region of the country which was under United
States military control at that time.

The United States’ major argument

was that no license had been immediately found with the goods on board
each ship, thus evading the order printed on each license that "this per
mit will accompany the shipment, and be surrendered at the custom-house."
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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision.

Justice

Miller wrote that neither party attempted to break the blockade, nor did
their cargoes contain enemy property.

The place where the goods were

purchased was under U.S. military control, and their purchase was author
ized by license.

Although those permits were not found with the goods,

they were probably on board, and lack of their immediate appearance was
not adequate ground for forfeiture.
The United States v. Weed is one of few cases found in which the
Supreme Court's strict adherence to legal and administrative principle
thwarted the government’s efforts to seize Confederate property.

Neither

claimant in this case transgressed his trade stipulations, and the obe
dience to wartime regulation was honored by the Supreme Court.
The other two cases involve the abuse of licenses granted in excep
tion to trade prohibition.

Walker’s Executors v. The

United States

(1862), the only case in this collection decided by the Taney Court,
originated from a presidential license granted to Samuel P. Walker on
March 6, 1865.

The license verified and described Walker’s ownership

of insurrectionary products in Mississippi and Alabama and his arrange
ments with parties in the same areas to buy other products.

Walker pro

posed to sell and deliver these goods to federal treasury agents under
the stipulations of the July 2, 1864
lations.

act and supporting treasury regu

The order provided Walker and his goods protection and safe

passage through military lines while going for or returning with the
products.
April 12, 1865, marked both the capture of Mobile by Union forces
and Walker’s purchase of 3,405 bales of cotton from Mobile resident
O'Grady.

0 ’Grady had bought the cotton from a Confederate treasury

agent, and much of it was still on plantations within Confederate land.
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On May 5 the counties in which this cotton was held passed under the
control of Union General E.R.S. Canby.

Canby issued an order stating

that the Confederate cotton in East Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
West Florida was to be surrendered to the United States government, and
any sale of this property except through federal treasury agents would
be treated as the embezzlement of public property.

Between June 30 and

December 1, 1865, almost two thousand bales of cotton from Mississippi
counties, including the cotton owned by Walker, were seized by U.S.
treasury agents and sent to New York.
These agents found the Walker cotton stored in territory embracing
Mississippi counties occupied by the Confederacy on and before Walker’s
April 12 purchase.

The Union occupied Mobile and Memphis from that date

until the end of the war.

Walker protested the seizure, but the court

of claims found him guilty of violating the nonintercourse statutues and
upheld the confiscation.

Before turning to the Supreme Court’s treat

ment of the case, that of McKee v. The United States

will be shown to

add a new dimension to a similar situation of Civil War trade.
That case focussed upon a sale of cotton owned by A. W. McKee.

From

1862 until the autumn of 1864 McKee was the general agent of the Confed
erate Treasury Department to purchase and dispose of cotton in Texas and
all of Louisiana lying west of the Mississippi River.
then within the military lines of the Confederacy.

These regions were

McKee was a resident

of the rebel section of Louisiana when he sold cotton stored on the banks
of the Red River to John McKee.

Purchaser McKee (no relation to A. W.)

bought this cotton on March 4, 1864, as a loyal citizen of the United
States.

He lived in New Orleans, a city then under U.S. military control.

Before his purchase, McKee was granted permission by federal military
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forces to pass through their lines into a rebellious region and to bring
away any property he might have purchased there.

The evidence also

showed that these authorities granted him a license to trade.

McKee had

not yet claimed his stored cotton when a U.S. flotilla seized it, and
carried it to Cairo where it was condemned.
The high court upheld the confiscation in Walker’s Executors and
McKee v. The United States, as both involved an abuse of the trading li
censes issued.

Under the stipulations presented in the July 2, 1864,

and previous nonintercourse acts, the Court found Walker’s April 12,
1865 purchase from 0 1Grady to be illegal.

At that time persons in Union-

occupied Memphis were forbidden without proper authorization to have
commercial intercourse with persons residing in federally-occupied Mobile,
because both cities were within insurrectionary states, and neither were
within the territorial exceptions made by Lincoln in 1863— those excep
tions being West Virginia and the ports of New Orleans, Key West, Port
Royal, and Beaufort.
Justice Harlan viewed Lincoln’s order of March 6, 1865, as autho
rizing Walker to proceed from Memphis to Mobile only after that city had
surrendered to the United States, and there to contract with O ’Grady for
the purchase of the cotton in question— cotton only recently Confederate
property and within a district occupied by insurrectionary forces.

The

order proceeded solely on the ground that Walker then (as of March 6)
owned the insurrectionary products, and that he then had arrangements
with parties in the vicinity of those places for other places of the
insurrectionary states.

It was in reference to such products that Pres

ident Lincoln ordered them free from seizure.
Walker did not own any part of the cotton in question on March 6,
1865.

The cotton was then owned by -planters who held it for the
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Confederate government.

If it was ever the property of O ’Grady, as

against the U.S., it did not become so until April 5, 1865.

There is

no evidence to support the fact that Walker entered into any contract
with O ’Grady until after the capture of Mobile.

The Court concluded

that the case seemed to be one in which the claimants sought to bring
under the operation of the March 6 order a transaction in cotton not
covered nor intended to be covered by it.

The contract that was made

between O ’Grady and Walker was in clear violation of the federal laws
forbidding commercial intercourse between persons residing in places
occupied by the national forces, and those persons residing in dis
tricts declared to be in insurrection.

Justice Harlan wrote that the

Walker agreement contradicted U.S. statutory policy.
The contract, upon the finding of facts, must be re
garded as one made between Walker and O ’Grady, in
palpable violation of the laws of the United States
forbidding commercial intercourse between persons
respectively residing in places occupied by the na
tional forces, with districts the inhabitants whereof
were declared to be in insurrection. It is there
fore, according to the settled doctrines of this
court, a contract from which could arise, in favor of
Walker, no right to the cotton, as
against the United
States, which could be enforced in
the courts of the
Union.20
Walker was found to have no right to the cotton in question, and the de
cision of the circuit court was affirmed.

Thus, the Taney Court and

its reputation for strict interpretation did not preclude deciding a
case in favor of the trade controls.
McKee was likewise found to have violated the 1864 and preceding
trade regulations, and the law of nations as well.
principle

"It is a familiar

of public law, that unlicensed business intercourse with an

enemy during a time of war is

not permitted.

Indeed, all lawsfor

bade trade with areas beyond the lines of U.S. military occupation.
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McKee’s license only allowed him passage through federal lines to bring
back property rightfully acquired— that is, goods purchased prior to the
state of hostilities.

Even if he had been granted a license to trade,

such permission was null and void.

McKee bought goods from Confederate

lands as a resident of Union-occupied territory.

The Ouachita Cotton

case comes to mind here, as the Supreme Court applied the same principles
in ruling against the claim of John McKee.
The Court’s decision is also reminiscent of Justice Johnson’s argu
ment in The Rapid. That case involved an American citizen who acquired
goods prior to hostilities and attempted to bring them through enemy
territory after the war began.

Those goods were seized as prize by an

American privateer in much the same way that McKee’s goods were seized
by an American flotilla.

Johnson’s words fit McKee’s predicament:

’The law of prize is part of the law of nations. In
it, a hostile character is attached to trade, indepen
dently of the character of the trader who pursues or
directs it. Condemnation to the use of the captor is
equally the fate of the property of the belligerent,
and of the property found engaged in anti-neutral trade.
But a citizen or ally may be engaged in a hostile trade,
and thereby involve his property in the fate of those
in whose cause he embarks.22
The effect of the acts subsequent to the 1861 restrictions, as seen by
military officers as well as civilians, may well have been a relaxation
of the nonintercourse stipulations, but the Supreme Court interpreted
them to be as limiting as any of the previous nonintercourse acts.
Two further cases involve instances wherein confiscated goods were
claimed under the rules of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act.
This act, passed by Congress in March of 1863, had many subsequent amend
ments, but its major purpose remained the same— to collect captured and
abandoned property in parts of the Confederacy occupied by Union forces.
As stated earlier, persons proving their loyalty before the court of
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claims could reclaim their property within two years after the cessation
of hostilities.

The cases in question involved complaints that stemmed

from acts of intersectional trade.

One involved a violation of the limi

tations on that trade, but in the other no transgression was found and
the owner’s claim was upheld.
The United States v. Grossmayer (1869) centered around one Elias
Einstein of Macon, Georgia, a man indebted at the beginning of the war
to Grossmayer of New York.

Einstein’s debt gave rise to a correspondence

maintained by a third party who conveyed messages between Macon and New
York throughout the Civil War period.

This exchange culminated in Gross

mayer ’s request that Einstein remit the amount due him in cash or by in
vesting the sum in cotton.
Since money could not be transmitted through the military lines,
Einstein chose the cotton alternative and shipped his purchase to Savannah
through Abraham Einstein for safe-keeping until the end of the war.

The

cotton was stored there under the latter’s name to prevent rebel seizure
by the U.SV and sold in New York.

Grossmayer filed in the New York

Court of Claims for the residue of the proceeds from that sale, asserting
that he was within the protection of the Captured and Abandoned Property
Act.

The court ruled that Einstein’s purchase for Grossmayer was not a

violation of the war intercourse acts, whereupon the United States ap
pealed the decision.
Supreme Court Justice Davis wrote that it was hard to see how Gross
mayer was protected under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, as
his action was forbidden by the nonintercourse act of July 1861.

Davis

referred to the law of nations in refuting the legality of Grossmayer!s
action.
It has been found necessary, as soon as war is commenced,

that business intercourse should cease between the
citizens of the respective parties engaged in it,
and this necessity is so great that all writers on
public law agree that it is unlawful, without any
express declaration of the sovereign on the subject.23
From his postwar perspective, Davis found it easy to overlook the actual
ity of Civil War trade, as he did any questioning of the 1861 statute, in
deference to the precedents of international law and their '’obvious" pro
hibition of interbelligerent trade.
A declaration was made following the 1861 act that dispelled any re
maining doubts concerning the legality of intersectional trade.

Lincoln's

proclamation directed the prohibition of intercourse to extend to debtors
and creditors on either side of the Union lines.

Davis did not

deny that

a resident in the territory of one of the belligerents might have an agent
in the other territory to whom his debtor could pay his debt in money or
property.
ever.

Such an agency must have been created before the war began, how

The act of appointing Einstein as Grossmayerfs agent to buy cotton

was completely illegal, as it was undertaken during the war.

Personal com

munication between Grossmayer and Einstein was not needed to make the act
unlawful.

As in the decision of Ouachita Cotton, the physical transport

of goods across sectional lines was not necessary to make their purchase
illegal, nor did the presence of an agent make the purchase any

more ac

ceptable than it had been in The United States v. Lapene.
The Court remained consistent in its rulings, stating that whether
the relation of debtor and creditor continued or changed to that of prin
cipal and agent, Grossmayer could not recover the proceeds of his cotton.
As he was prohibited during the war from having any dealings with Einstein,
nothing both or either did could have granted him title of the cotton.
Briggs v. The United States (1892) involved a similar claim, but in
this case the Court did not find a violation of the nonintercourse statutes.
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At the outbreak of the Civil War, Kentucky citizen Charles S. Morehead
owned two plantations near Egg’s Point in Mississippi.

He left his son

and an overseer in charge of the plantations and returned to Kentucky in
1861,

On April 18 he sold all the cotton presently on his plantation as

well as the 1862 crop to C, M. Briggs, also a loyal citizen and resident
of Kentucky.
In late 1862, the agents of Morehead’s plantations took part of the
cotton to Wilson’s Burn— a location used for storing cotton belonging to
or to be sold to the Confederacy.

The cotton was marked C.S.A. to save

it from destruction by Confederate soldiers, but it was not so marked by
Morehead’s direction.

In March 1863, the United States confiscated the

cotton and shipped it to Memphis where it was mingled with other cotton
and sold,
Briggs sought to claim the proceeds received from the sale of his
cotton, but the court of claims dismissed his petition.

The Supreme Court

reversed the lower court, finding that even though war was occurring at
the time of the sale, no law ruled against the Morehead-Briggs transac
tion.

Both parties were residents and citizens of Kentucky, and no agree

ment was made for the transportation and delivery of the cotton across
the lines separating Confederate from Union territory.

In this case, the

loyalty of Briggs to the Union and his title to the cotton were estab
lished to the Court’s satisfaction, and the case was sent back to the
court of claims to determine the proceeds due the petitioner.

Since the

act of purchase was not conducted across enemy lines, Briggs did not vio
late the nonintercourse statutes and so his claim was upheld.
Justice Field’s opinion in the

Briggs case made several references

to international law, and provided an interesting interpretation of the
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Captured and Abandoned Property Act as well.

He first referred to the

legality of a sale of property between two Confederate citizens.
The character of the parties as rebels or enemies did
not deprive them of the right to contract with and to
sell to each other. . . . It was commercial intercourse
and correspondence between citizens of one belligerent
and those of the other, the engaging in traffic between
them, which were forbidden by the laws of war and by the
President’s proclamation of nonintercourse. . . . But
commercial intercourse and correspondence of the citi
zens of the enemy’s country among themselves were nei
ther forbidden nor interfered with, so long as they did
not impair or intend to impair the supremacy of the na
tional authority or the rights of loyal citizens. No
people could long exist without exchanging commodities,
and of course, without buying, selling, and contracting.
And no belligerent has ever been so imperious and arbi
trary as to attempt to forbid the transaction of ordi
nary business by its enemies among themselves. No prin
ciple of public law and no consideration of public pol
icy could be subserved by any edict to thateffect; and
its enforcement, if made, would be impossible.24
The most important question was whether the United States acquired title
to the property by its capture and could disregard the petitioner’s claim
of ownership.

The Captured and Abandoned Property Act served to settle

this question.
The circumstances in which the late war originated, and
the fact that within the Confederate lines there were
multitudes of people who were sincerely attached to the
government of the Union- and desired its success, gave am
ple reason to the Federal government for a modification
of the harsh rules of war in regard to the capture of pro
perty on land, so as not to bring within the same calamity
friend and foe. It was a desire to ameliorate as much as
possible the exercise of the necessary belligerent right
of capture of property within the rebel lines, in its ap
plication to the property of persons thus friendly to the
Union, so far as cotton was concerned, which led to the
passage of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act. , . .
Davis was here perhaps trying to smooth ruffled southern feathers during
the Reconstruction era.

His is a rather sentimental statement; consider

ably less harsh that other pronouncements that viewed the Confederacy as
enemy.

The importance of returning to the status quo in the Court’s mind
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is perhaps here illustrated.
In explaining why such legislation was enacted, Davis continued
this tone, attributing more altruistic motives to the Union than others
have perceived.

Under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act,

. . . immense amounts of property belonging to citizens
of the United States, who sincerely mourned the origin
of the Confederacy, and longed for the re-establishment
of the national government, and who kept faith in their
hearts through the whole of the long struggle, were
accounted for and the proceeds restored to the rightful
owners; and certainly it must be regarded as a most
beneficent act on the part of the general government.25
Regardless of its evaluation of Union statutes, the Court proved a strict
judge in determining what did and what did not constitute illicit trade
across sectional divisions.
its decision.

It did not let allegiance to the Union sway

The Court thus interpreted statutory policy more faith

fully than some federal aupporters might have liked.
Matthews v. McStea (1875) is the last case in this discussion
because it reveals a novel variation of that faith.

The decision contra

dicted an earlier one, but maintained the Chase CourtTs support of Con
gress’ and Lincoln’s war powers.

Matthews v. McStea concerned the legal

ity of a bill of exchange issued by the New Orleans firm of Brander,
Chambliss & Company on April 23, 1861.

The bill was made payable in one

year to the order of McStea and accepted on the day of its date by the
firm in which Matthews was a member.

Matthews resided in New York and

the other members of his firm lived in Louisiana.

He disputed the bill's

legality, stating that since he and the other members were residents of
enemy territories, their copartnership was dissolved by the rules of war
before the bill was accepted on April 23, 1861.

Matthews interpreted

the blockade of April 19, 1861, as a prohibition of all commercial inter
course between the sections.

Supreme Court Justice Strong viewed the
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blockade regulations differently, however, and in this instance upheld
the legality of wartime commerce.
Strong stated that Lincoln’s proclamation of the April blockade was
indeed a recognition of a war waged.

He further conceded that one con

sequence of war, even if not formally stated, was always an interdiction
of trade between enemies:
Still further, it is undeniable that civil war brings
with it all the consequences in this regard which
attend upon and follow a state of war. Certainly
this is so when a civil war is sectional. Equally
with foreign war, it renders commercial intercourse
unlawful between the contending parties and it dis
solves commercial partnerships.26
Thus he reflected a viewpoint found in many of the other cases cited.
Exceptions to prohibition could enter, however, when licenses to
trade were authorized:
Trading with a public enemy may be authorized by the
sovereign, and even, to a limited extent, by a mili
tary commander. Such permissions or licenses are
partial suspensions of the laws of war, but not of
the war itself. In modern times, they are very common.27
Strong here cited Bynkershoek and Halleck for support.

Their findings

of a need to modify total trade interdiction were described previously,
yet Strong was the first to cite these authorities in order to overrule
total interdiction of interbelligerent trade.

Attorney General Speed

was earlier quoted as saying that the president should have "complete
control over the subject of trade between the loyal and disloyal."
Justice Strong supported this theory of executive discretion.

No for

mal declaration of war had been made, yet Lincoln recognized the exis
tence of a war by the April 19 blockade.

It then became his duty as

well as his right to say how the war should be carried on:

"In the

exercise of this right, he was at liberty to allow or license intercourse;
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and his proclamations, if they did not license it expressly, did, in our
opinion, license it by very cogent implications."

28

Strong here sup

ported the extension of executive authority already approved in the
Prize Cases decision.

This was one of very few instances in which

Lincoln’s use of executive discretion was directly addressed by the
Court during the Reconstruction period.
The early blockade proclamations carried the conviction that no
interdiction of commerce was intended except through the ports of desig
nated states.

On April 19, 1861, war was only inferentially realized,

and the measures proposed were avowed to be "with a view to . . . the
protection of the public peace and the lives and property of quiet and
orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall
have assembled."

29

This attitude was inconsistent with one that regarded

the citizens of insurrectionary states as public enemies and that con
sequently debarred them from intercourse with the inhabitants of loyal
states.

The only interference in trade was to be that which the block

ade might cause.
Strong here supported the Court’s earlier finding that a civil war
involved special considerations.

The Court granted the president extra

ordinary powers, but with good reason.

Subsequent congressional action

concerning the interdiction of trade confirmed Strong’s view that
. . . in a civil war more than in a foreign war, or
a war declared, it is important that unequivocal
notice should be given of the illegality of traffic
or commercial intercourse; for, in a civil war, only
the government can know whether the insurrection has
assumed the character of w a r . 30
This conclusion directly contradicted that of Justice Davis in U. S. v.
Lane.

In referring to the interdiction of trade necessitated by war,
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Davis found that "it needs no special declaration on the part of the
sovereign to accomplish this result, for it follows from the very nature
of war that trading between the belligerents should cease."
Strong disputed any natural assumption of trade interdiction, and
his decision seems to refute most legal precedent.

The July 13, 1861,

act stated that a presidential proclamation of a state of insurrection
would have to precede a cessation of trade between the North and the
South.

In accordance with this act, Lincoln's August proclamation

declared some states to be engaged in insurrectionary activity against
the United States, and thus prohibited commerce between such states and
the Union.

Strong wrote that both the act and proclamation exhibited a

clear implication that before the first was

enacted and the second

issued, commercial intercourse between the sections was not unlawful.
He reasoned in this manner:
What need of [commercial intercourse] should cease,
if it had ceased, or had been unlawful before? The
enactment that it should not be permitted after a
day then in the future must be considered an implied
affirmation that up to that day it was not unlawful;
and certainly Congress had the power to relax any of
the ordinary rules of w a r . 31
The court of appeals decision to uphold the partnership was supported,
and Matthew's appeal dismissed.
Matthews v. McStea thus provides an interesting conclusion for this
discussion of the Supreme Court cases dealing with interbelligerent trade.
Whether using the tenets of international law as a screen or not, the
Court largely upheld the statutes of Congress and the proclamations of
Lincoln as they were ideally intended.

As noted in the first chapter,

however, the proclamations and statutes often had dual intentions.
Supreme Court chose not to see the practical effect of the executive

The

power to license trade— the virtual unleashing of interbelligerent tradeand held that power as totally acceptable under the regulations of inter
national law.
Strong strayed from the established pattern in Matthews v. McStea,
but still upheld both the congressional and executive uses of wartime
power.

His decision helps illustrate the fact that the Chase Court

used judgment, rather than formula, to arrive at its decisions.

The

justices' conclusions may seem to have meshed, but the role of individual
interpretation and discretion must be remembered.

A recent article in

The New Republic pointed out a popular misconception of the Court's
manner of operation:

"Is the Supreme Court a court or a superlegislature

Many think of it as an automatic vending machine; put in a quarter,
press the button, and out tumbles a decision, like a bottle of Coke.
The machinery was invented, according to this theory, by the Founding
Fathers 200 years ago.

It shocks some people to think of the court as

a place of uncertainty."^
As it does today, the Supreme Court during the Civil War and
Reconstruction periods experienced its share of uncertainty.

The Court

sought to rise above the political pressures of the day without ignoring
the need to reaffirm the justice of Union victory and the worth of a
strong central government, and vested its decisions on trade in a legal
foundation above reproach.

These decisions were important, but they

must be considered in their Reconstruction context.

As Charles Fairman

writes, "The Court was performing its share in the labor of restoring
the national house to order.

This was a useful contribution, necessary

at that period, yet of transitory importance.

Some incidental rulings

on matters of practice have had significance.

But the major problems
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were mainly, such as the nation would not meet again. . . .
ter of its annals the Court performed

w e l l .

In this chap

"33

Thus, the possible overextension of the rules of international law
at the expense of other issues should not be exaggerated.

It is inter

esting to note, however, the way in which international law was used so
extensively to legitimize wartime measures.

Such considerations may

have been transitory, but they would reemerge as American history pro
gressed.

Modern warfare involved old rules, but new ones were devel

oping as well.

The judicial evaluation of interbelligerent trade was

not static in the nineteenth century, nor did it remain so during the
twentieth century.

The concluding chapter will examine how the modern

international attitude toward such trade developed.

The Civil War

was not to be the last American war; future hostilities brought with
them judicial and statutory decisions that further modified the tradi
tional stance toward trading with the enemy.
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CHAPTER III
INTERBELLIGERENT TRADE
AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

International law may have matured in the nineteenth century, but
its application to periods of warfare did not cease with the Civil War's
end.

The twentieth century provided ample opportunity for enforcing the

principles of enemy trade prohibition.

The administration of those tenets

improved, and the gap between theory and practice so evident during the
Civil War narrowed in subsequent hostilities.
Watts revealed the following:

A.D.M. McNair and A. D.

"Up to and including the early years of

the nineteenth century the orthodox view upon trading with the enemy was
not nearly so severe as it is now, and it was customary frequently to re
lax the general principle by granting to persons in this country, and in
the enemy country 'licenses to trade1. . .
International war brought with it new possibilities of interbellig
erent trade, and political leaders perhaps recognized the need to uphold
its prohibition in both principle and practice.

In its support of statu

tory laws regarding wartime trade, the Supreme Court likewise adhered to
the rules of international law.
The Spanish-American War was the first major conflict which tested
this increasing severity.

Two cases that came to the Supreme Court's

attention concerned the status of enemy merchant ships during that war.
Before the 1850s, the international practice was to seize ships in port
even if warning of war had not been given.
80

Breaking precedent in 1853,
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Turkey gave a warning to Russian merchant vessels in her ports.

Other

European nations adopted this practice, as did America when she went to
war with Spain in 1898.

A presidential proclamation issued on April 25,

1898, stated that the United States would allow Spanish merchant vessels
anywhere within the country until May 21, 1898, to load their cargoes and
depart.

Such vessels, if met at sea by any American ship, would be per

mitted to continue if their papers showed that their cargoes were taken
on board before the expiration of the April 25-May 21 term.

Although

this proclamation was not a license to trade, it permitted some flexi
bility within the sphere of increasingly stringent statutory policies
and executive decrees regarding interbelligerent trade.
This generosity did not extend to ships carrying officers in mili
tary service of the enemy, or to ships containing any coal (except that
necessary for the voyage), any article prohibited as contraband of war,
or any dispatch of the Spanish government.^

The case of Buena Ventura

(1899) concerned a Spanish merchant ship captured on the morning of April
22, 1898, eight or nine miles off the Florida coast.

At the time of cap

ture, the vessel was on a voyage from Ship Island, Mississippi, to Rot
terdam, by way of Norfolk, Virginia.

The ship was carrying a cargo of

lumber.
Arriving at Ship Island on March 31, 1898, the Buena Ventura sailed
for Rotterdam on April 19 with a fully authorized permit to call at Nor
folk for a supply of bunker coal.

When captured on April 22 she made no

resistance, had on board no military or naval officer, and carried no
arms.
Authorities questioned whether the Buena Ventura could be included
under the confiscation exemption accorded "Spanish merchant ships, in any
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ports or places within the United States."

The Supreme Court held that

the provision should include not only those Spanish ships in port on
April 21 (the day that war was declared), but also any that had sailed
on or before May 21, whether before or after the commencement of the war
or the issuing of the proclamation.

While the proclamation did not speci

fically include vessels that sailed from the United States before the
commencement of war, such vessels were within its intention.

Restitution

was, therefore, awarded to the owners of the Buena Ventura.
The Pedro also set sail during the Spanish-American War under a Span
ish flag.
Cuba.

Officered and manned by Spaniards, she loaded in Antwerp for

On March 18, 1898, an American firm chartered the vessel to pro

ceed to Pensacola, Florida, or Ship Island, Mississippi, for a cargo of
lumber destined for Rotterdam or Antwerp.
Shortly thereafter, Pedro sailed from Antwerp with a cargo of mer
chandise for Havana and Cienfuegos.

The ship arrived at Havana on April

17, and after discharging her cargo, sailed five days later

for Santiago,

Cuba, with a small quantity of general merchandise taken at Havana.

Pedro

was captured while sailing to Santiago by an American blockading fleet
on April 22, when she was a few miles from Havana.
The Supreme Court decided in 1899 that Pedro did not fall within the
exemption offered by the April proclamation.

The vessel lay at Havana

from April 17 to 22, and cleared from Havana on April 22, the day after
the war began.

She had then no cargo for any United States port, only

merchandise for enemy ports (Santiago and Cienfuegos).

It was assumed

that she either knew of the hostilities or knew that they were imminent.
The Court decided that Pedro was neither bringing a cargo to the United
States for the increase of its resources nor for the convenience of its

citizens.

Instead, she was an enemy vessel trading with an enemy port.

The Supreme Court held that a contract to proceed ultimately to an Ameri
can port did not bring the vessel within the exemptions contained in the
executive proclamation.

3

This decision reaffirmed a familiar tenet of international law.

As

Henry Halleck stated a generation earlier, "The entire absence of any in
tention to violate the law, no matter how perfect the innocence of the
intent may have been, nor whether the act resulted from mistake or ignor
ance, cannot avert the penalty of confiscation."^

The ultimate destina

tion of the goods rather than the intent of the shipper determined the
character of the trade.

It did not matter how circuitous the route by

which the goods reached their destination.

An executive proclamation

issued during the Spanish-American War relaxed the restrictions of prize
law somewhat, but the Supreme Corut carefully guarded against taking ille
gal advantage of that relaxation.
When World War I erupted, the belligerents by statute and executive
decree reinforced their acceptance of the tenets of international law re
stricting wartime trade.

In September 1914, Great Britain passed the

Trading with the Enemy Act, which forbade (except under license) all trans
actions during the war prohibited by common law, statute, or proclamation.
These transactions included all arrangements that would improve the fi
nancial or commercial position of a person trading or residing in an enemy
country.

It also prohibited trade with a belligerentTs allies.

The pro

perty of persons engaged in such illicit intercourse was confiscable.
By the Decree of September 17, 1914, France likewise prohibited all
trading by French citizens with the enemy.

The French enactment included

as enemies not only the subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary but also
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persons resident in hostile territory who were not nationals of the enemy

6

powers.

These French and English regulations were not surprising, given

the history of international law and wartime trade restrictions.
war did, however, lead to a new area of concern.

World

To what degree could a

corporation assume an enemy character?
Daimler Company Limited v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great
Britain) Limited (1916) focussed on a company formed in 1905, with an of
fice in London, for selling German motor tires in the United Kingdom.
The company was formed by one incorporated in Germany under German law.
The German company held more than 90 percent of its shares.
was held by the secretary of the company.

One share

Born in Germany but a United

Kingdom resident, the secretary became a naturalised British subject in
1910.

Three of the company’s four directors resided in Germany when war

began, and the fourth left England for Germany when war broke out.

During

the war, the company secretary directed the respondent company to pay for
goods shipped to the German parent company before the war began.

Balking

at the summons to pay, the British company stated that such payment would
contravene the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914.

The Court of Appeals

upheld the secretary’s right to institute such action, but the House of
Lords reversed its decision.
Lord Parker of Waddington explained that the British company’s con
trol by the German corporation afflicted it with an enemy character.

In

his decision, Lord Parker illustrated how the rules of enemy character
applied to an artificial person, incorporated by forms of law.

He there

by established a set of rules to govern future cases dealing with enemy
corporations.
He wrote that a company incorporated in the United Kingdom was a
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legal entity.

Not a natural person with mind or conscience, it could be

neither friend nor enemy.
properly authorized.

Such a company could only act through agents

While carrying on business in England through such

agents, and residing there or in a friendly country, it was to be regula
ted as friend.
The company would assume an enemy character if its agents or persons
in de facto control of its affairs resided in enemy country, adhered to
the enemy, or took instructions from or acted under the control of the
enemy.

The character of individual shareholders did not of itself affect

the character of a corporation in either peace or war.

The enemy character

of individual shareholders and their conduct could, however, help deter
mine whether the companyfs agents were acting under the control of ene
mies.

The power of determination would vary with the number of sharehol

ders who were enemies and the value of their holdings.
In a similar way a company registered in the United Kingdom, but
carrying on business in a neutral country through agents properly autho
rized and resident in Britain or in a neutral country, was to be regarded
as friend.

Such a firm could, through its agents or persons in de facto

control of its affairs, assume an enemy character.
his decision with this admonition:

Lord Parker closed

MfIt was suggested in argument that

acts otherwise lawful might be rendered unlawful by the fact that they
might tend to the enrichment of the enemy when the war was over. . . .
The prohibition against doing anything for the benefit of an enemy con
templates his benefit during the war and not the possible advantage he
may gain when peace c o m e s . P a r k e r here reinforced a tenet of interna
tional law— only trade conducted during the period of hostilities was li
able to condemnation.

The concept of the corporation or its agents as enemy assumed greater
importance as World War I continued.

Enemy trade was becoming less an il

legal exchange made between two individuals, and more a transaction invol
ving branches of the same international corporation.
Related to the First World W ar’s measures to control trade were Stat
utory or "Black" Lists instituted in 1915 by both Great Britain and France
All commercial intercourse by British and French citizens with the listed
persons or firms was forbidden on account of their enemy character or as
sociations.

By a subsection of the English Trading with the Enemy (Ex

tension of Powers) Act of 1915, corrections and additions of further per
sons or firms to the Statutory Lists could be made by an Order in Council.
John Colombos writes that in Great Britain’s case, the adoption of
such lists marked a departure from the ordinary criteria governing enemy
character.

Individuals or corporations on the lists most often were resi

dents of or transacted business in neutral countries.

In these lists,

Great Britain applied the test of nationality to enemy character, and not
the traditional criterion of domicile.

"It is noteworthy that the United

States, which at first had energetically protested against the establish
ment of the 'Black Lists,’ and had even, on September 8, 1916, passed a
’Revenue’ Act threatening retaliatory measures against the Allies, ad
hered to the Anglo-French system soon after their entry into the war, by
issuing similar lists in 1917 and 1918."

9

The United States followed Anglo-French precedents in other instances
after joining the Allies in 1917.

The American Trading with the Enemy

Act of 1917 was modelled after the British Act.

This legislation was

instituted to prevent aid and comfort to the enemies; to make available
for the financing and successful prosecution of the war such funds and

property in this country as belong to the enemies or their allies; and to
protect interests in the property rights of private c i t i z e n s . I n the
American act, as in its British counterpart, the increasing severity of
policy noted by McNair and Watts is apparent.
The American act defined the enemy to be . . .
any individual, partnership, or other body of indivi
duals, of any nationality, resident within the terri
tory (including that occupied by the military and
naval forces) of any nation with which the United States
is at war, or resident outside the United States and
doing business within such territory, and any corpor
ation incorporated within such territory of any nation
with which the United States is at war or incorporated
within any country other than the United States and
doing business within such territory.il
This definition is considerably less complicated than was that of the
enemy during the Civil War.
S'

The act also defined an enemy ally and the concept of trade, and ex
plained the need of an executive license to practice such trade.

It was

illegal to transport an enemy subject anywhere, and only someone in gov
ernment service or authorized by the president could bring into or send
out of this country any tangible form or writing except in the regular
mails.

The act forbade any attempt to send, take, or transmit out of the

United States any letter or other writing, book, any plan, or any form
of communication intended for an enemy or his ally.

Such a transmission

was legal only if the communication was submitted to the president or an
officer directed by the president, and if a license was then issued.

The

act of 1917 also authorized the president to censor communication by mail,
cable, radio, or any other means passing between the United States and a
foreign country.

Warfare had clearly come a long way— if it can be seen

as embodying progress— since the Civil War.

The possible means of inter

belligerent trade had expanded considerably since the days of Louis

A.
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Welton.
An important office instituted by the act was that of the Alien Pro
perty Custodian.

T. S. Woolsey wrote an editorial during the war explain

ing the need for this office.

When World War I began, many Germans liv

ing in the United States were not enemies.
enemy property nor was it confiscable.

Their property thus was not

Owing to the "intricacies and

complexities of modern commerce," however, enemy property in great vari
ety rested within the United States in the form of goods on sale, bran
ches of banks, stocks and bonds in American corporations, and insurance
companies taking risks in America.
No government could permit its enemy to draw upon such resources for
the prosecution of war.

In order to do justice to enemy property rights,

yet prevent their use against the nation, the United States impounded
that property and placed it in the charge of a public official accounta
ble for all property taken over at the war's end.

This official was the

Alien Property Custodian, an individual "vested with all of the powers
of a common-law trustee in respect of all property, other than money,
which shall come into his possession in pursuance of the provisions of
this Act."12

Claims made by this office resulted in many lawsuits filed

during and following the war.

Such litigation, however, does not deal

with an actual exchange of goods, so will not be examined in detail in
this chapter.
Another aspect of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 did not
touch directly upon instances of interbelligerent trade.

The act re

fused to authorize the prosecution of a suit in a United States court
by an enemy before the end of the war.

An enemy licensed to trade under

the act could prosecute, however, if the action arose out of business
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transacted in the United States under license and as long as the license
remained effective.

Alien enemies could also defend themselves when

sued.
In summarizing statutory policy, executive decree, and the judicial
posture taken regarding interbelligerent trade during World War I, it ap
pears that all three sought to reinforce existing restrictions and to in
troduce some new elements of discipline regarding illicit wartime com
merce.

The institution of the "black lists" and the office of Alien Prop

erty Custodian are significant examples of the trend noted earlier by
McNair and Watts.

The Allied powers agreed concerning these measures.

Both England and America instituted stricter guidelines than were auth
orized previously, intending to clarify ambiguous areas of law and to
allow only specific incidents of interbelligerent trade.
In a period of warfare subsequent to World War I, the United States
was not in such agreement with the friendly European nations.

She broke

from the mainstream with a carefully worded explanation issued during the
Spanish Civil War.

The Department of State made public a telegram sent

to the American embassies in Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Moscow, and
Valencia.

The Department had, "with great reluctance," issued a license

for the exportation of a shipment of airplanes and engines to the port
of Bilbao in Spain— the principal port of entry held by the forces of the
Spanish government.

As the telegram explained,

. . . the joint resolution of Congress now in effect
providing for an embargo against the shipment of arms,
ammunition, and implements of war to 1belligerent
countries1 does not apply to the present civil strife
in Spain as it is applicable to wars between nations.
The present authority for the issuing of licenses
contains the following provision:
TLicenses shall be
issued to persons who have registered as provided for
except in cases of export or import licenses where
exportation of arms, ammunition or implements of war
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would be in violation of this Act or any other law
of the United States or a treaty to which the United
States is a party, in which cases licenses shall not
be issued.’ As none of these exceptions exist in the
case of the Spanish situation the right to a license
could not be denied.13
The history of the trade embargo on war goods mentioned in the State
Department's telegram goes back to the Spanish-American War.

In both

World Wars, the president was empowered to control all exports to all
destinations.

Otherwise, with rare exceptions, controls upon exports

before 1945 were limited to war materials or to articles exported to coun
tries with which America was at war.

Export controls also applied to

countries at war with others or to those in which a state of civil strife
existed.^

Though part of Trading with the Enemy legislation, such em

bargoes did not control "trading with the enemy" as such.

The embargo

would play an increasing role in foreign policy maneuvers as the twenti
eth century advanced.
The Second World War brought with it an expansion of many executive
powers, and the policies toward interbelligerent trade issued by the Al
liesreflected that expansion.
ing with

Britain again led

the Enemy Act of 1939.

the way with the Trad

This act had two objectives.

One was

to create and define the criminal offense of trading with the enemy by
statute, that offense being "any commercial, financial or other inter
course or dealings with, or for the benefit of an enemy."

The second ob

jective was to prevent the payment of monies to the enemies and to pre
serve enemy property in contemplation of arrangements to be made at the
conclusion of peace.

To this end, a Custodian of Enemy Property was

created, the British counterpart to the American Alien Property

C u s t o d i a n .

In another attempt to define "the enemy," the act tested such char
acter by residence rather than by allegiance.

The statute also created

15

91
another statutory list of enemies and gave power to the Board of Trade
to apply the provisions of the act to any area, whether occupied or not.
The case of Vandyke v . Adams (1942) provided an interesting test of
statutory policy regarding enemy character.

The plaintiff in the case

claimed to be entitled to the release of a sum of money deposited in the
joint names of himself and the defendant.

The defendant was an officer

in the army captured in 1940 and detained as a prisoner of war in Ger
many or German-occupied territory.

In January 1942 the plaintiff asked

for an Order dispensing with the service of a writ upon the defendant.
This request was based on the Rule of Court that authorized a court or
judge to dispense with the service of a writ of summons, or a notice of
such a writ, on any defendant who was an enemy under the 1939 act.

The

question was whether the defendant was an enemy under the Trading with
the Enemy Act of 1939 or whether he was an individual resident in enemy territory.
The House of Lords held that a soldier in His Majesty's Army who had
the misfortune to have been taken prisoner during the war and who was de
tained as a prisoner in Germany was not an enemy in any sense of the word.
Refusing to make an Order to dispense with service of the writ, the Court
based its decision on the doctrine that detention by the enemy as priso
ner precludes the notion that he can be said to be resident in Germany,
as his confinement there is entirely against his will.

1 fi

As the question of enemy character was resurrected during World War
II, so was that of the enemy corporation.

Lubrafol Motor Vessel (owners)

v. Pamia (owners) (1943) concerned a plaintiff company incorporated in
Belgium that had taken proceedings in a collision action for damages
made to a ship.

The defendant moved the Court to stay all further
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proceedings on the ground that the plaintiffs relied on an Order in Coun
cil of the Belgian government made in Belgium on February 2, 1940, that
enabled Belgian commercial companies, without losing their Belgian na
tionality, to transfer their

head offices to a neutral country.

The plaintiffs contended that they had taken appropriate steps at
Pittsburgh to transfer the company’s domicile from Antwerp to America.
Since the Belgian company transferred its commercial domicile to the
United States, the Court held that it was not an enemy, and dismissed the
motion to stay proceedings.^^
Another case decided by the English court upheld the enemy charac
ter of a corporation, but also recognized that corporation’s right to
file suit when acting under an authorized license to trade.

In Schering

A. G. v. Pharmedica Property Limited (1950), the plaintiff was refused
the right to make an injunction to restrain infringement of a trademark
by the defendant, as the plaintiff was incorporated in Germany and the
defendant in Australia.

After amending its claim to reveal that it was

operating in Australia under an authorized license, the Court defended
the plaintiff’s right to maintain action.

Plaintiff claimed that it

acted under a proclamation issued by the Governor-General on June 1,
1949, under Section 15 of the 1939 Trading with the Enemy Act, exempting
from the provisions of the act ’’trade. . . with or for the benefit of
any. . . body of persons carrying on business in Germany, in pursuance
of an agreement or contract made or entered into after the date of this
license," and by further alleging that it had traded in New South Wales
following agreements made since June 1, 1949.

Maintaining the plain

tiff’s right to such action, the Court stated, "It is, of course, clear
that where an enemy alien is present in this country by license he is
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entitled to sue without having the necessity of obtaining an express li
cense permitting him to sue. . . . The license to trade must, I think,
carry with it the right to sue for the purpose of protecting the trade
which is licensed."

18

This right was mentioned earlier in a discussion

of American statutory policy during World War I.
The potential enemy status of the corporation and the rights provi
ded or denied to that entity also concerned America during World War II.
On December 8, 1941, Congress closed a considerable gap in the powers of
the president over enemy-controlled corporations through adoption of the
First War Powers Act.

This legislation amended several sections of the

1917 Trading with the Enemy Act.^^
The War Powers Act stated that unless authorized by a license ex
pressly referring to this general ruling, no person shall, "directly or
indirectly, enter into, carry on, complete, perform, effect, or other
wise engage in, any trade or communication with an enemy national, or
any act or transaction which involves, directly or indirectly, any trade
or communication with an enemy national."^0

These prohibitions also ap

plied to an enemy national seeking to conduct any acts or transactions
with the United States.
The act defined "enemy national" as the government of any country
against which the United States had declared war and any agent repre
senting that government or the government of any "blocked" country hav
ing its seat within enemy territory.

Also included in the definition

was any individual in enemy territory except one

acting with the armed

forces or employed and acting for the government

of any United Nations,

any person whose name appeared on "The Proclaimed List of Blocked Na
tionals," or any person acting directly or indirectly for an enemy
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national (other than a United States prisoner of war) if such enemy na
tional was within any country against which the United States had de
clared war.21
The list of blocked nationals mentioned in the definition
from action taken by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

resulted

President Roosevelt author

ized the Secretary of State on July 17, 1941, to prepare a list of per
sons acting for or collaborating with Germany or Italy, persons to whom
the direct exportation of any article from the United States was deemed
detrimental to the interest of national defense.

Additions and deletions

were made to this list until it was withdrawn in 1946.

Upon withdrawal,

the accompanying statement warned that some trade restrictions still
existed.
In certain cases, accounts will continue to be blocked
by reason of nationality.
Similarly, the withdrawal
of the Proclaimed List does not imply that all former
Proclaimed List nationals are regarded as satisfactory
agents for American business. . . . However, the with
drawal of the Proclaimed List does represent an impor
tant step in the United States policy of freeing trade
from wartime controls as soon as such action becomes
possible.22
The practice of blocking or "freezing" foreign accounts began after
the invasions of Denmark and Norway.

On October 10, 1940, the president

by executive order froze the assets in the United States of those coun
tries and their inhabitants.

By June 14, 1941, the "freezing" included

most of continental Europe, and another executive order provided for the
automatic extension of the freeze to such new countries controlled or
occupied by any of the existing blocked countries.

The freezing orders

required reports concerning all European-owned property in the United
States to be filed with authorities.

Prohibited, except under license,

were nearly all types of dispositions of such property.

These freezing
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orders are again not directly tied to interbelligerent commerce, but are
mentioned because they rested on the foundation of the 1917 Trading with
the Enemy Act.

The act gave the president the power to "investigate,

regulate, or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange as well as the
export or earmarking of corn, bullion or currency, transfers of credit
(except those transactions to be executed wholly within the United States)
and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property ei
ther between the United States and a foreign country, or between resino
dents of foreign countries by any person within the United States."
These freezing orders, the list of blocked nationals, and the term
"enemy national" were aimed primarily at nonresident "enemies" who had
property in the United States, not at enemy nationals in the narrow sense
of the term residing in the United States.

These latter nationals could

be controlled to some extent, the former could not.^4

The 1941 act also

illustrated the importance of corporate trade in World War II and how
statutory policy sought to control it.

As Marjorie Whiteman stated,

"The enemy character of corporations is naturally of importance because
of the value of the property they hold.

Under Article 2 of the Trading

with the Enemy Act, this enemy character was determined by incorporation
in the enemy state, and by incorporation outside of the United States,
but by doing business in an enemy state.

An important third criterion

was lacking— that of enemy control, whether through the management or
the stockholders."

25

Two cases reveal how the First War Powers Act closed this gap.
Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. McGrath, Attorney General (1952) again
denied a corporation its seized or "vested" property.

Uebersee was

affected with an "enemy taint," and under the control and domination of
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an enemy national.
forbidden.^5

The recovery of its vested property therefore was

Kaufman v. Societe Internationale (1952) also involved a

corporation, this time Swedish, that had its American assets vested on
the ground of its control by Germans.

The petitioners, American citi

zens who owned stock in the corporation, moved to protect their claims
on the corporation’s assets which they alleged would not be pressed by
the dominant enemy group.
ferent light.

The Supreme Court viewed this claim in a dif

The Court held that under the 1941 Amendment to the"Trad

ing with the Enemy Act, the nonenemy character of a foreign corporation,
because it was organized in a friendly or neutral nation, no longer con
clusively determined that all interests in the corporation must be
treated as friendly or neutral.

Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in Kaufman

maintained the following:
Enemy taint can be found if there are enemy stockhol
ders; even the presence of some nonenemy stockholders
does not prevent seizure of all the corporate assets.
. . . Our holding is that when the Government seizes
the assets of a corporation organized under the laws of
a neutral country, the rights of innocent stockholders
to an interest in the assets proportionate to their
stock holdings must be fully protected. . . . The inno
cent stockholder may not have a title to corporate as
sets, but does have an interest which Congress has in
dicated (Section 2 of Trading with the Enemy) should
not be confiscated merely because some others who have
like interests are enemies.27
Although strict, the new definition of the enemy corporation did not
cause undue hardship to friendly or neutral parties with interests in
such a corporation.

Two cases that reached the Supreme Court after the

war illustrated other considerations that tested the new definitions of
enemy character and other facets of the 1941 act.
In Guessefeldt v. McGrath (1952), the plaintiff was a German nation
al who lived in Hawaii from 1896 to 1938.

He took his family to Germany

for a vacation but was unable to return to America in 1939 because of the
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outbreak of war.

Guessefeldt was involuntarily detained by German auth

orities after the United States entered the war, and then detained by the
Russians after 1945.

After returning to the United States in 1949, he

brought action to recover property vested by the Alien Property Custodian.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a resident within
Germany, so was not an enemy.

"Residence within" implied "something

more than mere physical presence and something less than domicile.

Nor

was the plaintiff prevented from recovery by Section 39 of the Trading
with the Enemy Act stating that 'no property or interest therein of Ger
many, Japan, or any national of either such country vested. . . shall
be returned.1" ^
The Court found Section 39 to be of peripheral concern to the case
at hand, and stated that the plaintiff fell under the class of friendly
aliens protected under the Fifth Amendment requirement of just compen
sation.

Thus, Guessefeldt was seen not to be afflicted with an enemy

character, and his property was returned.

This decision is reminiscent

of the English Vandyke v . Adams, and proved the Court not unreasonably
harsh in interpreting enemy residence and character.
The Court proved equally openminded in considering the principle
denying the enemy the right to bring action in an American court.

On

August 17, 1951, the Japanese government brought action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the
Commercial Casualty Insurance Company and the Frederick Mahogany Compa
ny.

This action resulted from the breach of a contract entered into in

April 1949— a contract approved by the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers.

The action was filed after the cessation of hostilities between

the United States and Japan but before the peace treaty was signed.
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Holding that the Government of Japan could maintain the action on grounds
of a treaty of peace, the District Court found the Japanese government
recognition to be a political and not a judicial question.
The basic reason, at common law, for denying access to
our courts as plaintiffs to nonresident, alien enemies
was that not to do so might give aid and comfort to the
enemy. The contract in suit did not give such aid or
comfort, it was approved pursuant to the policy of the
U.S. government which encouraged its making. It cannot
be said that this contract is void as against public
policy. This suit could have been maintained at common
law; we now consider Whether it is prohibited by statute.
We conclude that it is not.29
Thus ends the discussion of judicial and statutory attitudes raised
during World War II towards trading with the enemy.
Enemy

The Trading with the

and War Powers acts carried restrictions touching upon fields

other

than actual interbelligerent trade, but fields considered as properly
within the scope of trading with the enemy.

Now a wholly international

affair, warfare carried considerations far more complex than those in
volved during the Civil War.

Statutory and judicial policies paralleled

this complexity in seeking to ensure victory and justice during those
twentieth-century hostilities.
An examination of developments in enemy trade policies since World
War II showed that such considerations did not end in 1945.

The onset

of the Cold War necessitated interbelligerent trade regulations, as did
a violent offshoot of that hostility-— the Vietnam War.
In February 1967 a group sponsored by the Quaker Action Group sailed
in the Phoenix to deliver medical supplies to the victims of American
bombing in North Vietnam.

The Department of State refused to validate

their passports, stating that it was unlawful to engage in unlicensed
transactions with North Vietnam and that the Quaker mission would include
furnishing goods or services to that country.

Also illegal was sailing
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any American documented ship or taking a cargo aboard such a ship if
destined for North Vietnam.
Other Americans then applied for a license to send funds to the
Canadians Friends Service Committee for their Vietnam aid program.

The

United States Treasury Department issued this statement on February
27, 1967:
The Treasury announced today that it is denying all
pending requests for licenses to send funds to re
lief agencies abroad to purchase medical supplies for
shipment to North Vietnam. The decision to deny the
licenses was made at the recommendation of the Depart
ment of State after it ascertained that North Vietnam
refuses to permit impartial observers from any relief
agency to witness the distribution of the supplies. .
. . Under these conditions, there is no assurance that
the supplies will in fact be devoted to the nonmilitary
purposes intended by the donors, and the United States
government does not, therefore, believe it proper to
issue further licenses under such circumstances.31
United States military involvement in Vietnam has ended, but the
trade restrictions continue.

In at least one area, the Cold War trade

restrictions are creating difficulties.

An article in a 1973 issue of

San Diego Law Review discusses the growth of multinational corporations
and their conflicts with individual nations* trade restrictions.

As

author Jack Hodges reported, "A subsidiary formed under the laws of a
host nation but owned and controlled by a United States corporation can
trigger problems of conflicting allegiance.”

32

The United States limits trade with Communist countries by regula
tions passed under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act.

Amended in 1933,

the act now applies also to any other presidentially declared emergency.
The current period of emergency began in 1950 and continues today.

Trade

embargoes are now administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
When Hodges' article was written, the Peoples Republic of China, North
Korea, and North Vietnam were all under a complete trade embargo.

Four

sets of Foreign Assets Control Regulations have been issued by the
Office, and a subparagraph of one set allows the United States to
assume jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries of American multi
national corporations irrespective of nationality.

Penalties imposed

for willful violations of the act are criminal in nature and as defined
in the Trading with the Enemy Act constitute up to ten years imprison
ment, a $10,000 fine, or both.

A second set of regulations limits

the trading of strategic commodities to all Communist countries except
Cuba and Yugoslavia.

In 1970, restrictions were loosened to all

countries but the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, and Tibet.
Since 1975, there has been further relaxation of trade restrictions
toward the Peoples Republic of China.

The 1970 legislation permitted

trading to the allowed Communist nations if the shipment were made via
certain western countries.
Many European countries have protested the American control over the
multinational corporations.

One instance of this conflict concerns

branches of the Ford Motor Company.

The American Ford Motor Company

was forbidden in 1973 by United States law to trade with the Peoples
Republic of China.
Canadian subsidiary.

The company owned Ford Limited of Canada, a
Under American law, the Detroit-based parent was

liable if the Canadian subsidiary traded with Red China.
other hand, authorized and encouraged such commerce.

Canada, on the

As Hodges concluded

America must decide if the risk of alienating such
allies as Canada, France, and Great Britain is worth
depriving such small countries as North Korea, North
Vietnam, and Cuba of our trade. If future attempts
at control produce greater opposition, if American
influence continues to dwindle, if multinational cor
porations are caught in a bind between conflicting
regulations because of American foreign policy, the
United States may see not only a loss of allies, but
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a loss of economically vital multinational cor
porations as w e l l . 33
Hodges’ "small countries" have suddenly loomed large, as America’s
and the world’s eyes are fixed on Iran and Afghanistan.

Trade embargoes

have resumed their importance as part of the economic sanctions that
now play a major role in foreign policy.

The purpose here is not to

offer a commentary on modern foreign affairs, but to show how concerns
over enemy trade have continued to the present day.

Trade has always

been seen as an area of vital importance during any type of warfare—
be it civil, worldwide, or cold war— and the resulting statutory re
strictions and judicial condemnations have met with varying degrees of
success in stemming illicit trade.
This thesis has examined statutory and judicial rulings concerning
interbelligerent trade and briefly mentioned the practical circumstances
surrounding such commerce.

These circumstances have not been offered

as excuses for illicit trade, but to provide a wider context for the
discussion of legal theory, statutory laws, and court decisions.

Civil

War Supreme Court decisions adhered more closely to the tenets of inter
national law than did the provisions when put into practice.

But prac

tical circumstances affecting the Court may have occasioned this adher
ence as much as any respect for international law.
Whatever the reasons, statutory restrictions in later periods of
warfare followed the judgments of international law as well, but more
successfully prohibited illicit trade in both theory and practice.
Perhaps the later trade was easier to regulate than that described as
taking place during the Civil War.

The Civil War differed from the

conflicts described in this chapter because of its nineteenth-century
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setting and because of the special nature of civil war.
The enemy status of the Confederacy remained confused throughout
the war, and many in the North who did acknowledge the South as enemy
were uncertain about the extent of warfare needed.

Specifically, many

northern politicians— including the Union’s president— remained uncon
vinced that a total interdiction of trade between the sections was
necessary.

Total prohibition meant great harm to both sections’

economies.

Few would challenge the idea that most Northerners sought

a reunited nation.

Destruction of both the southern and northern

economies— not to mention international trade relationships— would
hardly promote the speedy resurrection of a strong and united America.
This is not to say that all sought some degree of trade merely
for the good of the economy.

The Civil War was fought on home ground,

and individuals outside and within government circles faced both great
material deprivation and its converse— frequent opportunities for sub
stantial and sudden wealth.

Practicing illicit trade was just one

avenue for advancement, but it was a lucrative one indeed.
With the advent of twentieth-century foreign and world war, many
considerations important to Civil War leaders became irrelevant.

Trade

prohibition could be proclaimed with fewer fears of self-deprivation.
Economic warfare assumed the status of military warfare, and hostilities
included efforts to crush the enemy economy.

A war fought on enemy

soil brought fewer immediate temptations to transgress trade regulations,
and the patriotism engendered by foreign war quite possibly lessened
the extent of illicit trade.
The growth of multinational corporations also facilitated the
ability of American leaders to control wartime trade.

Trade was no
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longer exclusively an exchange of goods between two individuals or small
businesses.

Corporate transactions could be halted by freezing the

assets of a nation.

The federal government took (and is taking) more

action of this type as the twentieth century progressed.
The powers of all three branches of the federal government, and
especially those of the executive branch, have expanded considerably
since Lincoln’s day.

Lincoln did not seek rigidly to control inter

belligerent commerce, but subsequent wartime presidents did so endeavor.
Their attempts to control trade succeeded because these leaders assumed,
and were granted, greater discretionary powers.

This is an effort to

excuse neither Lincoln nor the ineffective congressional controls of
wartime trade in the Civil War.

Rather, it is an explanation of the

considerations that must accompany study of Civil War efforts to deal
with interbelligerent trade.

The statutory laws and executive decrees

issued by both North and South were neither rigidly enforced nor obeyed.
No matter how much one reads of the legal principles surrounding the
concept of trading with the enemy and the application of those principles,
one cannot consider them without some knowledge of the practicalities
inherent in a specific conflict and in any period of warfare.

Theory and

practice are quite often two different things, and this thesis has
served to illustrate the importance and the verity of that finding.
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